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IDEOLOGICAL COHESION AND PRECEDENT
(OR WHY THE COURT ONLY CARES ABOUT
PRECEDENT WHEN MOST JUSTICES AGREE
WITH EACH OTHER)'
NEAL DEVINS**
This Article examines the profound role that ideological
cohesion plays in explaining the Supreme Court's willingness to
advance a coherent vision of the law-either by overruling
precedents inconsistent with that vision or by establishing rule-
like precedents intended to bind the Supreme Court and lower
courts in subsequent cases. Through case studies of the New
Deal, Warren, and Rehnquist Courts, this Article calls attention
to key differences between Courts in which five or more Justices
pursue the same substantive objectives and Courts which lack a
dominant voting block. In particular, when five or more Justices
pursue the same substantive objectives, the Court is far more
willing to overturn precedent and embrace rule-like precedent.
In contrast, when there is not a dominant voting block, the Court
will either rule narrowly so as to keep its options open or issue
seemingly broad rulings that are in tension with, but do not
overrule, the important precedents of past Courts. By
highlighting the profoundly important role of ideological
cohesion among the Justices, this Article also offers a
commentary on the models that political scientists use to describe
judicial decisionmaking. Unlike political science models which
focus on the desire of individual Justices to pursue favored policy
outcomes, this Article suggests that the key variable in
understanding Supreme Court policymaking is the presence or
absence of five or more ideologically simpatico Justices at a
particular moment in time. Finally, this Article speculates on the
future of precedent on the Roberts Court. Noting that the
Roberts Court lacks a dominant voting block, this Article
suggests that the Roberts Court is unlikely to overrule significant
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precedent or issue significant rule-like decisions (at least until a
new President is able to use the appointment power to create a
dominant voting block).
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INTRODUCTION
This Article will advance a commonsense argument about the
Supreme Court's willingness to establish a coherent vision of the
law-either by overruling precedents inconsistent with that vision or
by establishing rule-like precedents intended to bind the Supreme
Court and lower courts in subsequent cases. Specifically, this Article
will call attention to the profound role that ideological cohesion plays
in explaining the Court's willingness to embrace a coherent or
incoherent vision of the law. When five or more Justices pursue the
same substantive objectives, the Court will act as a coherent body. It
will overrule precedents inconsistent with its vision and will establish
constitutional precedents that embrace a coherent view of the law. In
sharp contrast, when five or more Justices do not share the same
vision of the law, Court decisionmaking will be defined by either
divergent voting blocks or the predilections of so-called swing
Justices. Lacking ideological cohesion, such a Court will not advance
a consistent view of the law. For example, rather than establish a
clear line of constitutional precedent, an incoherent Court will, at
various times, rule narrowly so as to keep its options open or issue
seemingly broad rulings that are in tension with, but do not overrule,
the important precedents of past Courts.
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This Article will illustrate differences between coherent and
incoherent Courts through abbreviated case studies of the New Deal
Court, the Warren Court (pre- and post-1962),' and the Rehnquist
Court. The New Deal Court and post-1962 Warren Court exemplify
the practices of coherent Courts-striking down important decisions
inconsistent with their policy preferences and establishing bold
precedents (many of which were truly trailblazing-advancing the
Justices' preferences with little regard for earlier Court
decisionmaking).2 In this way, the dominant coalitions on the New
Deal Court and post-1962 Warren Court recognized that precedents
were both opportunities and constraints-a mechanism to advance
their vision of the law while simultaneously placing limits on lower
courts and possibly on subsequent Supreme Courts.3 Moreover, since
1. With respect to the Warren Court, there is some controversy over whether the
early Warren Court ended in 1961 (when the Court began ruling in support of civil
liberties interests) or 1962 (when Arthur Goldberg joined the Court, so that there was a
solid block of five Justices backing progressive positions). Compare Jeffrey A. Segal &
Harold J. Spaeth, Decisional Trends on the Warren and Burger Courts: Results from the
Supreme Court Data Base Project, 73 JUDICATURE 103, 104 (1989) (arguing that the
Goldberg appointment was largely inconsequential to the trajectory of Warren Court
decisions), with Mark Tushnet, The Warren Court as History, in THE WARREN COURT IN
HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE 1, 7 (Mark Tushnet ed., 1993) (arguing that
the Goldberg appointment was transformative). In my view, the Goldberg appointment
transformed the Warren Court. As Lucas Powe points out, Segal and Spaeth's data does
not take into account key cases that were held over-so that the Court could be
reconstituted after the retirement of conservative-leaning Justice Charles Whittaker.
LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 498 (2000). In
any event, the debate over whether 1961 or 1962 is the critical year is largely irrelevant to
the points made in this Article. The key point is that there was a solid block of five or
more Justices willing to back up progressive positions.
2. See infra Part II. For an article highlighting the dearth of cited precedents in the
landmark rulings of the post-1962 Warren Court, see generally James H. Fowler &
Sangick Jeon, The Authority of Supreme Court Precedent, 30 SOC. NETWORKS 16 (2008).
For a complimentary perspective in this Symposium, see generally Lee Epstein et al., On
the Capacity of the Roberts Court To Generate Consequential Precedent, 86 N.C. L. REV.
1299 (2008) (highlighting critical role that ideological cohesion plays in determining
Court's willingness to write significant decisions); and Nancy Staudt et al., On the Role of
Ideological Homogeneity in Generating Consequential Constitutional Decisions, 10 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 361 (forthcoming 2008) (empirical study highlighting role of ideological
homogeneity in generating consequential precedents).
3. See THOMAS G. HANSFORD & JAMES F. SPRIGGS II, THE POLITICS OF
PRECEDENT ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 12-14 (2006). For a provocative and
somewhat competing perspective, see Tonja Jacobi & Emerson H. Tiller, Legal Doctrine
and Political Control, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 326, 341-42 (2007) (arguing that Supreme
Court Justices will take into account lower court policy preferences when sorting out
whether to embrace standards that give greater discretion to lower courts or rules that
hamstring lower courts). As a theoretical matter, Jacobi and Tiller's argument makes
sense. But, for me, it is a model that needs to be backed up with facts-as I do not think
that the Justices are as nuanced in their calculations as are Jacobi and Tiller.
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there was a majority of ideologically simpatico Justices on these
Courts, the Chief Justice could use his opinion assignment power on
the basis of the organizational needs of the Court and not ideology. 4
On the other hand, the early Warren and Rehnquist Courts
lacked a dominant coalition and, as such, were unable to free
themselves of the shackles of precedent. Rather than feel
empowered to advance their vision of legal policy, these Courts either
operated in the shadow of earlier precedent or, alternatively, steered
clear of establishing meaningful constitutional precedents. Their
decisions thus amounted to a hodgepodge of constitutional
avoidance, judicial minimalism, and the refusal to reconcile
inconsistencies between past precedent when establishing seemingly
contradictory constitutional doctrines. With respect to opinion
assignments, the Chief Justice (or, if the Chief Justice dissented, the
Senior Associate Justice in the majority) was more strategic-paying
significant attention both to ideology and the need to make sure that
five Justices would sign onto a majority opinion.'
Notwithstanding dramatic differences in the decisionmaking
styles of coherent and incoherent Courts, these Courts (and that is to
say, all modern Courts) approach the making or overruling of
constitutional precedents as a means to an end-not something
possessing significant, independent force.6 Coherent Courts pursue
their vision of legal policymaking with zeal and are quite willing to
overrule significant precedents that embrace a competing legal
regime.7 For incoherent Courts, their failure to overturn significant
precedents has little to do with some abstract belief in the rule-of-law
benefits of stare decisis.8 Rather, incoherent Courts simply lack the
4. See Forrest Maltzman & Paul J. Wahelbeck, A Conditional Model of Opinion
Assignment on the Supreme Court, 57 POL. RES. Q. 551, 551 (2004).
5. See id.
6. The political science literature likewise describes precedent in instrumental
terms-arguing that the Court preserves its political capital by acting like a court (making
use of existing legal rules and principles). Consequently, while disagreeing over the
constraints that precedent places on judicial policymaking, there is general agreement that
the Justices cite precedent in order to demonstrate their legitimacy. See LEE EPSTEIN &
JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 163-77 (1998) (arguing that precedent
limits the Justices in their pursuit of favored policies); HANSFORD & SPRIGGS, supra note
3, at 24-30 (arguing that the Justices legitimate policy choices by citing precedent);
JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 76-85 (2002) (arguing that precedent is cited for
legitimacy purposes but does not meaningfully restrict judicial discretion).
7. See infra Part II.
8. For the classic rule-of-law defense of stare decisis, see Planned Parenthood of Se.
Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-55 (1992). For additional discussion, see infra notes 60-63
and accompanying text.
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votes-there is no dominant coalition pushing the Court to embrace
some shared vision of legal policymaking.9 Indeed, by either refusing
to establish constraining precedents or by keeping on the books
seemingly irreconcilable precedents, incoherent Courts have little use
for a theory of stare decisis grounded in the stability of precedent.
This Article is divided into three parts. Part I examines
incoherent Courts. It discusses in some detail the swing-Justice-
dominated Rehnquist Court, drawing distinctions between the
decisionmaking styles of Justices O'Connor and Kennedy. Part I also
discusses the pre-1962 Warren Court, highlighting that Court's use of
constitutional avoidance on national security issues. Part II examines
coherent Courts. It uses the New Deal Court to illustrate the Court's
willingness to overrule significant precedents in order to repudiate
one legal regime (laissez-faire) in favor of another regime. Part II
also uses the post-1962 Warren Court to demonstrate the ways a
coherent Court feels unbounded by law in order to establish its vision
of optimal legal policymaking. Part III ties together the case studies
in a forward-looking way, speculating on the future of precedent in
the Roberts Court. 10
Before turning to Part I, a comment about the models that
political scientists employ to describe judicial decisionmaking is
necessary. Focusing on the desire of individual Justices to pursue
favored policy outcomes, political scientists typically see Supreme
9. By emphasizing the presence or absence of a dominant coalition, this Article is
not arguing that the vitality of precedent is linked to the size of the coalition that votes for
a decision. See HANSFORD & SPRIGGS, supra note 3, at 126 (finding that coalition size has
little impact on whether a precedent is interpreted positively or negatively). The point,
instead, is that the existence of a dominant coalition is figurative in the Court's willingness
both to overrule past precedents and establish bold precedents. See Epstein at al., supra
note 2.
10. Although this Article examines the New Deal, Warren, and Rehnquist Courts, the
line that separates one Court from another is not the Chief Justice who presides over that
Court. The focus, instead, is whether or not there is a solid coalition of five or more
Justices who are ideologically simpatico-which may exist for some but not other years of
any Chief Justice's tenure. For that reason, the Warren Court seems incoherent before
1962 and coherent afterwards. Also, there is an inevitable murkiness to the labels
"coherent" and "incoherent." The degree of agreement among Justices varies, even in a
coherent Court. The second Warren Court, for example, became more liberal and more
coherent after Thurgood Marshall joined it. See Segal & Spaeth, supra note 1, at 107.
Likewise, the substitution of Clarence Thomas for Thurgood Marshall moved the
Rehnquist Court to the right-but not enough to make it a coherent Court. See infra Part
I.A. Needless to say, there is sufficient turnover among Supreme Court Justices to suggest
that the relative coherence/incoherence of a particular Court will vary over time. At the
same time, the basic point of this Article remains true: the more cohesive the Court, the
more likely the Court is to pursue a coherent vision of legal policymaking; conversely, the
more incoherent the Court, the less likely the Court is to pursue a coherent vision.
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Court Justices as simply voting their policy preferences (the
attitudinal model) or making strategic choices to maximize their
policy preferences-taking into account institutional legitimacy
concerns as well as the preferences of other Justices and/or elected
officials and the American people (the strategic actor model)." This
Article approaches things in a somewhat different way and, in so
doing, provides a commentary of sorts about the dominant political
science models. In particular, by paying attention to whether there
are five or more ideologically simpatico Justices at a particular
moment in time, this Article suggests that different political science
models work best in describing discrete Courts (the Rehnquist Court,
the New Deal Court) or discrete periods of time (pre- versus post-
1962 Warren Court). This will be developed further in Part III,
highlighting a preference for a Court-centered view of judicial
decisionmaking to a Justice-centered model. In so doing, Part III
links this Article with the models that political scientists employ to
describe judicial decisionmaking.
I. INCOHERENT COURTS
The Rehnquist and early (pre-1962) Warren Courts exemplify
the practices of incoherent Courts. The Rehnquist Court did not
overturn significant, controversial precedents of the Burger and post-
1962 Warren Courts. 2 It did not break significant doctrinal ground
outside of federalism, and its federalism revival was itself incoherent
(limited in reach and marred by decisions that seemed to contradict
each other). 3 Moreover, it often divided five to four on controversial
cases, with the Court's so-called swing Justices (Anthony Kennedy
and Sandra Day O'Connor) sometimes voting with the "liberal" wing
11. See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 6 at 86-97 (describing the attitudinal model);
EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 6, at 10-12 (describing the strategic actor model). For a
somewhat competing account of the strategic model, see Lee Epstein, Jack Knight &
Andrew Martin, The Political (Science) Context of Judging, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 783, 798
(2003) (suggesting that-notwithstanding earlier claims by most researchers (including
themselves)-the strategic model sees Justices maximizing "goals," not simply policy
preferences).
12. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court: A
Preliminary Analysis, 47 ST. Louis U. L.J. 569, 570 (2003); Robert F. Nagel, Bowing to
Precedent, WKLY. STANDARD, Apr. 17, 2006, at 24.
13. See Linda Greenhouse, Foreword: The Third Rehnquist Court, in THE
REHNQUIST LEGACY, at xiii, xiv, xx (Craig M. Bradley ed., 2006); Merrill, supra note 12,
579-81, 586-87 (noting shift from social issues to issues of federalism); Peter J. Smith,
Federalism, Instrumentalism, and the Legacy of the Rehnquist Court, 74 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 906, 907-08 (2006).
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of the Court and sometimes joining forces with the Court's
"conservative" wing. 14
The early Warren Court was likewise sharply divided, issuing a
significant number of five-to-four decisions on controversial cases. 5
It too was reluctant to overturn significant constitutional precedents
and had shifting voting alignments. 6 And while it issued some
watershed rulings, 7 it made repeated use of "constitutional
avoidance" techniques to sidestep constitutional rulings on free
speech challenges to antisubversive legislation. 8
In explaining Rehnquist and early Warren Court approaches to
the making and following of precedent, this Article will focus on two
abbreviated studies. For the Rehnquist Court, it will take a hard look
at the Court's seemingly contradictory decisionmaking in Washington
v. Glucksberg,9 which rejected a constitutional challenge to assisted-
suicide prohibitions, and Lawrence v. Texas,2" which invalidated
same-sex sodomy laws. Glucksberg, as will be explained, exemplifies
the Rehnquist Court's practice of keeping its options open in
subsequent cases-either by making fact-specific rulings and/or by
minimizing precedents that are not backed by a majority of the
14. See Dahlia Lithwick, A High Court of One: The Role of the "Swing Voter" in the
2002 Term, in A YEAR AT THE SUPREME COURT 13 (Neal Devins & Davison M. Douglas
eds., 2004). For additional discussion, see infra Part I.A.
15. During the 1960 Term, for example, the Court split five to four on twenty-three of
fifty-three non-unanimous civil liberties cases. See Segal & Spaeth, supra note 1, at 104.
For additional discussion, see infra Part I.B.
16. During its 1953-1961 Terms, the Court overturned eleven precedents (as
compared to the thirty-one it overturned during its 1962-1968 Terms). See Lori A.
Ringhand, The Rehnquist Court: A "By the Numbers" Retrospective, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
1033, 1075-77 (2007) (compiling data). For additional discussion, see infra Part I.B.
17. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), broke significant doctrinal ground. In
particular, by finding that challenges to legislative apportionment were justiciable, Baker
overturned Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946), and laid the groundwork for judicial
challenges to legislative distinctions. The pre-1962 Warren Court also broke doctrinal
ground in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Mapp both established the exclusionary
rule and overturned longstanding precedent. For a discussion of the Court's willingness to
overrule precedent in Mapp, see LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND
AMERICAN POLITICS 195-99 (2000). For a discussion of Baker's significance, see Stephen
Ansolabehere & Samuel Issacharoff, The Story of Baker v. Carr, in CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW STORIES 297 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2004). See also infra notes 142-46 and
accompanying text (discussing the post-1962 Warren Court's dramatic expansion of Baker
in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964)).
18. For an excellent treatment of early Warren Court avoidance, see generally Philip
P. Frickey, Getting from Joe to Gene (McCarthy): The Avoidance Canon, Legal Process
Theory, and Narrowing Statutory Interpretation in the Early Warren Court, 93 CAL. L.
REV. 397 (2005). For additional discussion, see infra Part I.B.
19. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
20. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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Justices. That the Court overruled Texas's sodomy ban in Lawrence
underscores the ultimate irrelevance of the Glucksberg precedent.
Against this backdrop, this Article will provide additional details
about the Rehnquist Court's reluctance to impose constraints on itself
or lower courts through rule-like decisions.
For the early Warren Court, this Article will examine the
constitutional avoidance and domestic security cases (beginning with
the pro-communist Red Monday cases and ending with the Court's
seeming abandonment of those cases)."1 Like the Rehnquist Court,
the early Warren Court kept its options open. By making use of
statutory, not constitutional, law the Court did not have to overturn
(or even confront) precedent when retreating from its earlier rulings.
Correspondingly, the pre-1962 Warren Court's reluctance to overrule
or establish significant constitutional precedents reflects the absence
of a solid coalition able to advance a single ideological agenda.
A. The Rehnquist Court22
The Rehnquist Court (1986-2005) promised, but did not deliver,
a constitutional revolution. With four Justices nominated by Ronald
Reagan (and with all four on the Court from 1987-2005),23 the
Rehnquist Court seemed destined to embrace Reagan's brand of
judicial conservatism. When running for President in 1980 and 1984,
Reagan both pledged to appoint judges who "share our commitment
to judicial restraint" and reached out to social conservatives by
condemning Supreme Court decisions on school prayer, busing, and
especially abortion.24 In particular, Reagan called for the overruling
of Engel v. Vitale 5 and Roe v. Wade26-- saying that "God should
[never] have been expelled from the classroom" and that Roe was as
divisive and wrong as Dred Scott v. Sanford27 had been.28
21. See infra Part I.B.1.
22. Portions of this Section are drawn from Neal Devins, Substantive Due Process,
Public Opinion, and the "Right" To Die, in THE REHNQUIST LEGACY, supra note 13, at
327.
23. Reagan nominee Anthony Kennedy was confirmed in February 1987, joining
Reagan appointees Antonin Scalia, Sandra Day O'Connor, and Chief Justice William
Rehnquist. Members of the Supreme Court of the United States, http://www.supreme
courtus.gov/about/members.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2008).
24. 1984 Republican Party Platform, reprinted in 40 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 55-B (1984).
25. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
26. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
27. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 383 (1856).
28. See Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session with the Student Body of
Providence-St. Mel High School in Chicago, Illinois, 1 PUB. PAPERS 600, 603 (May 10,
1406 [Vol. 86
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The social conservative agenda, however, was not the agenda of
the Rehnquist Court. By steering a centrist path, the Rehnquist
Court avoided controversy and, for the most part, tracked public
opinion.29  Furthermore, with shifting voting alignments and a
propensity to divide five to four (doing so in more than twenty
percent of all cases and in a much higher percentage of controversial
cases),3" the Rehnquist Court's identity was largely defined by the
voting predilections of Justices O'Connor and Kennedy.3' On
abortion and school prayer, O'Connor and Kennedy, citing concerns
of stare decisis and the Court's legitimacy, cast key votes to reaffirm
the essential holdings of Roe and Engel.32  Indeed, "Republican
domination of the [Rehnquist] Court" did not result "in the
overruling of a single revolutionary Warren Court decision."33
This is not to say that the Justices were unwilling to overturn
precedent. The Rehnquist Court overturned forty-four constitutional
precedents.34  The Court's targets, however, underscore the
incoherence of Rehnquist Court decisionmaking. The Court steered
neither a liberal nor a conservative path when overturning precedents
(reaching liberal results in forty-one percent and conservative results
in fifty-nine percent of these cases).3 More than that, the Rehnquist
Court was highly selective in its invocation of stare decisis-taking
the doctrine seriously when it backed up the result it preferred and
ignoring it when it did not.36
Justices O'Connor and Kennedy held the key to the Court's on-
again, off-again approach to both making and adhering to precedent.
These two Justices had dramatically different styles-and, not
1982) (commenting on school prayer); RONALD REAGAN, ABORTION AND THE
CONSCIENCE OF THE NATION 16-21 (1984) (commenting on Roe & Dred Scott).
29. See Neal Devins, The Majoritarian Rehnquist Court, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
63, 63 (2004); Jeff Rosen, Center Court, N.Y. TIMES MAG., June 12, 2005, at 17, 17-18.
30. LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS,
AND DEVELOPMENTS 240-41 (4th ed. 2007) (detailing results in Table 3-4).
31. As to whether O'Connor or Kennedy was the "most powerful" Justice, compare
JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE 7 (2007) (arguing that O'Connor is the most powerful noting
"few Justices in history dominated a time so thoroughly or cast as many deciding votes as
O'Connor"), with Paul H. Edelman & Jim Chen, The Most Dangerous Justice: The
Supreme Court at the Bar of Mathematics, 70 S. CAL. L. REV 63, 96 (1996) (describing
Kennedy as the most powerful).
32. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 510 U.S. 1309 (1994) (upholding legality
of abortion); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (limiting school prayer in public
schools).
33. Nagel, supra note 12, at 24.
34. See Ringhand, supra note 16, at 1040 tbl.3.
35. Id.
36. See infra notes 37-86.
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surprisingly, dramatically different approaches to precedent. Also,
their willingness to join a majority opinion (rather than filing a
concurrence agreeing with the result but not the reasoning)
sometimes hinged on the Court embracing a view of the law that
seemed limited to the case at hand. In other words, rather than
embrace a determinative view of some legal issue, the Court signaled
that the doctrinal formula used in one case might well be limited to
that case-either because of the narrowness of the ruling or the
failure of the ruling to either cite or repudiate prior precedents. To
make these points more concrete, this Article turns to Washington v.
Glucksberg37 and Lawrence v. Texas.38
1. Washington v. Glucksberg
Written by Chief Justice William Rehnquist (for a five-member
majority that included Justices Kennedy and O'Connor), Glucksberg
found that there is no right to assisted suicide by applying "[o]ur
established method of substantive-due-process analysis."39  In fact,
Glucksberg is a mess-filled with omissions, internal inconsistencies,
and a general disregard of the precedent it claims to follow. The
explanation: the Chief Justice thought it better to sacrifice a clear
statement of doctrine in order to secure the votes of Justices Kennedy
and O'Connor.n"
To win over Justice Kennedy, Chief Justice Rehnquist could not
favorably cite Bowers v. Hardwick.4' In Bowers, the Court concluded
that states can criminalize same-sex sodomy and, in so doing, limited
the sweep of substantive due process protections.42 Contending that
the Court "is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when
it deals with judge-made [rights]," Bowers confined substantive due
process to those rights that are grounded in our nation's legal
traditions and practices.43 In Glucksberg, the Court appeared to
embrace and extend Bowers. It declared that fundamental rights
37. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
38. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
39. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720.
40. The Chief Justice's willingness to strike such a deal followed his practice of
"'[taking] each case as it came.' " Jeffrey Rosen, Rehnquist the Great?, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, Apr. 2005, at 79, 87 (quoting Michael K. Young, a former Rehnquist clerk).
This practice advanced his agenda without worrying about whether his decision cemented
"'an overarching theory of substantive constitutional interpretation.' " Id. (quoting Jack
Goldsmith of Harvard Law School).
41. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
42. See id. at 190-91.
43. Id. at 194.
[Vol. 861408
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must both be "objectively, 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition' " and " 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.' "'
But Justice Kennedy disapproved of Bowers. Before casting the
key vote in Lawrence v. Texas4 (overturning Bowers), Justice
Kennedy had signaled his discomfort with Bowers. In 1996, he wrote
the majority opinion in Romer v. Evans,' a decision rejecting (on
equal protection grounds) a Colorado law prohibiting the granting of
"protected status" to gays.47 Kennedy's decision made no mention of
Bowers4 --even though Justice Scalia's dissent strenuously argued
that it was nonsensical for the Court to allow one state to criminalize
same-sex sodomy while forbidding another state from denying
protected status to gays.49
Assuming that Justice Kennedy would not sign on to a decision
that strongly backed Bowers, the Chief Justice may have thought it
better to ignore Bowers than to risk losing one of the Justices in his
fragile five-member coalition. For similar reasons, Chief Justice
Rehnquist seemed to limit Glucksberg's reach in order to secure
Justice O'Connor's vote. In a telling footnote, he acknowledged that
his "opinion does not absolutely foreclose" future challenges to
assisted-suicide laws." For such a challenge to succeed, however, the
Court would have to depart from the standard it employed in
Glucksberg, namely, that substantive due process rights be
"objectively, 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.' "'
In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor made clear that she
would not join an opinion that absolutely barred substantive due
process challenges to assisted-suicide laws. Noting that a mentally
competent person experiencing great pain may have a fundamental
right to hasten his or her death, Justice O'Connor joined Glucksberg
insofar as there was 'no reason to think the democratic process"
would not strike the appropriate balance on the issue. 2 For his part,
Chief Justice Rehnquist was glad to have Justice O'Connor join his
44. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-21 (internal citations omitted).
45. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
46. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
47. Id. at 631-32.
48. Id. at 623-36.
49. See id. at 642 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("If it is rational to criminalize the conduct,
surely it is rational to deny special favor and protection to those with a self-avowed
tendency or desire to engage in the conduct.").
50. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735 n.24 (1997).
51. See id. at 720-21.
52. Id. at 737 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Stephen Breyer supported the
recognition of such a fundamental right and consequently joined the O'Connor
concurrence "except insofar as it joins the majority." Id. at 789 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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opinion-even if it meant adding a footnote directly at odds with the
decision's purported methodology. 3
In addition to making concessions to Justices Kennedy and
O'Connor, Glucksberg is replete with references to contemporary
practices and the sensibility of state bans on assisted suicide.54 To put
it plainly: by following several different paths in Glucksberg, the
Court did little more than announce an outcome. More than that,
Glucksberg's cavalier attitude to existing precedent (most notably, its
refusal to discuss Bowers) suggests that subsequent courts need not
even discuss Glucksberg when deciding the next relevant dispute.
Witness, for example, the Court's 2003 decision in Lawrence v.
Texas."
2. Lawrence v. Texas
The irrelevance of Glucksberg as a precedent and the competing
decisionmaking styles of Justices Kennedy and O'Connor were on full
display in Lawrence. This Section starts with Justice Kennedy's five-
member majority opinion, in which Glucksberg played no role.
Although overruling Bowers, Kennedy did not endeavor to
distinguish the opinion he joined in Glucksberg.56 But, as the
Lawrence dissent made clear, the two decisions could not be
reconciled. In particular, rather than sort out whether a
constitutional right to sodomy (or same-sex sodomy) is "objectively,
'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition,' ""e Lawrence
speaks of "[flreedom extend[ing] beyond spatial bounds," of
"[1]iberty presum[ing] an autonomy of self," and of legal prohibitions
of same-sex sodomy "involv[ing] liberty of the person both in its
spatial and in its more transcendent dimensions." 9
53. For a more thorough treatment of intra-Court dynamics in Glucksberg, see
Devins, supra note 22, at 338-44.
54. See, e.g., Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 730-35 (referencing the sensibility of a state ban
on assisted suicide).
55. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
56. See id.
57. See id. at 594 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority opinion did not
"describe homosexual sodomy as a 'fundamental right' or a 'fundamental liberty
interest' ").
58. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-21 (citation omitted).
59. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562. Lawrence, moreover, looked beyond American history
and norms to European Court of Justice interpretations of the European Convention of
Human Rights. Id. at 573. For these and other reasons, commentators on both the left
and right think that Lawrence "shatters" Chief Justice Rehnquist's efforts to use
Glucksberg to cabin substantive due process. See Nelson Lund & John 0. McGinnis,
Lawrence v. Texas and Judicial Hubris, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1573-75 (2004)
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Likewise, Kennedy's decision paid scant attention to another
opinion that he helped author, the plurality opinion in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.' Casey spoke
broadly about the key role that stare decisis plays in the American
legal system and set forth an elaborate test to assess whether Roe v.
Wade should be reaffirmed.61 In Lawrence, the Court made no
reference to the Casey test in explaining why it thought Bowers was
wrongly decided.62 Instead, Kennedy's opinion refers to another
aspect of Casey-the plurality's conclusion that "[a]t the heart of
liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life."63
It is telling that Kennedy saw no reason to struggle over apparent
inconsistencies with his Lawrence decision and the methodology he
embraced in both Glucksberg and Casey. It is almost certainly true
that Kennedy agreed with the outcomes in those decisions and did
not want to disavow them. And if other Justices in the Lawrence
majority disapproved of those decisions, their support of Kennedy's
expansive language in Lawrence was sufficiently strong that they did
not want to back Kennedy into a corner (by demanding, for example,
that he disavow Glucksberg) or otherwise call attention to
inconsistencies in Kennedy's jurisprudence (by filing a concurring
opinion). For these Justices, it was enough for Kennedy to ignore
(condemning Lawrence's lawlessness); Robert C. Post, Fashioning the Legal Constitution:
Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 106 (2003) (celebrating Lawrence).
60. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
61. See id. at 854-55. Although concluding that Roe should be reaffirmed, the Court
determined that the trimester standard embraced by Roe should be jettisoned in favor of
the so-called "undue burden" standard. See id. at 873-74. The Court also overturned
decisions relying on the trimester standard, concluding that the trimester standard
impermissibly limited state authority over abortion. See id. For critiques of Casey
(suggesting, among other things, that it endorsed a makeshift, results-oriented approach to
stare decisis), see Gerard V. Bradley, Is the Constitution Whatever the Winners Say It Is?,
in THAT EMINENT TRIBUNAL: JUDICIAL SUPREMACY AND THE CONSTITUTION 10, 10-
19 (Christopher Wolfe ed., 2004) [hereinafter EMINENT TRIBUNAL]; Robert F. Nagel,
Nationhood and Judicial Supremacy, in EMINENT TRIBUNAL, supra, at 20, 20-36; and
Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Worst Constitutional Decision of All Time, 78 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 995 (2005). Likewise, there is reason to doubt the sincerity of the Rehnquist
Court's embrace of precedent in Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
Although upholding Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1996), the Rehnquist Court
severely gutted Miranda both before and after Dickerson. See Yale Kamisar, Dickerson v.
United States: The Case That Disappointed Miranda's Critics-And Then Its Supporters,
in THE REHNQUIST LEGACY, supra note 13, at 106.
62. In his Lawrence dissent, Justice Scalia remarked that the Court did not even
"bother to distinguish-or indeed, even bother to mention-[Casey's] paean to stare
decisis." Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 587 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
63. Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
1411
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
disfavored decisions (just as it was enough for Justice Kennedy that
Chief Justice Rehnquist ignored Bowers when writing Glucksberg).64
The other telling feature of Kennedy's opinion is its sweeping
language about the "transcendent dimensions" of "liberty," about
"[f]reedom extend[ing] beyond spatial bounds., 65  This language,
"like many of his opinions, was written to be quoted, not analyzed. 66
Reflecting both his intense interest in how his decisions are perceived
and his "expansive view of the courts' role in public life,' 67 Kennedy
was far more interested in "throwing down moral thunderbolts" than
in following past precedent (even his own).68
In sharp contrast, Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in
Lawrence broke no doctrinal ground. Reflecting her tendency "to
focus on the particulars of the dispute before the Court" and to
embrace "rationales on which diverse people can agree, 69 Justice
O'Connor argued that the Texas law was grounded in an
impermissible purpose ("moral disapproval" of gays) and,
consequently, there was no need to revisit Bowers.7" In other words,
just as she had carved out a palliative care exception in Glucksberg,
O'Connor resisted Kennedy's expansive reasoning-preferring,
instead, a "flexible," "context-specific" approach.7 In this way,
64. See generally Chris W. Bonneau et al., Agenda Control, the Median Justice, and the
Majority Opinion on the U.S. Supreme Court, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 891 (2007) (focusing on
the discretion that other Justices give to a Supreme Court Justice tasked with writing a
majority opinion). I also think it seems likely that Senior Associate Justice John Paul
Stevens assigned Lawrence to Kennedy precisely because Kennedy was willing to write an
expansive ruling, making use of substantive due process to invalidate the Texas sodomy
law.
65. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562.
66. MARK TUSHNET, A COURT DIVIDED 178 (2005) (discussing Kennedy's
"pomposity" in the flag-burning decision). For a similar critique of Lawrence, see Lund &
McGinnis, supra note 59, at 1575.
67. JAN CRAWFORD GREENBURG, SUPREME CONFLICT 160 (2007); see also
TUSHNET, supra note 66, at 176 (noting a former Kennedy clerk once told Jeffrey Rosen
about Kennedy's seeming obsession with "how it's going to be perceived, how the papers
are going to do it, how it's going to look").
68. Edward Lazarus, The Pivotal Role of Justice Anthony Kennedy, FINDLAW'S
WRIT, Aug. 3, 2003, http://writ.news.findlaw.comilazarus/20030803.html. For a similar
critique of Kennedy's 2007 decision in the partial-birth abortion case, see Charles Fried,
Op-Ed., Supreme Confusion, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26,2006, at A25.
69. Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Minimalism, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1899, 1907 (2006).
70. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 582 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor had
joined Bowers (not to mention Glucksberg), and I think she had little interest in admitting
error in prior decisions.
71. TUSHNET, supra note 66, at 54 (quoting favorably from NANCY MAVEETY,
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR: STRATEGIST ON THE SUPREME COURT 31 (1996)).
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O'Connor kept her options open.7" A subsequent case could always
be distinguished on factual grounds, so that (unlike Kennedy) there
was no need for O'Connor to play fast and loose with precedent.
Correspondingly, by filing concurring opinions, O'Connor made clear
that she would not be constrained by the reasoning employed in the
majority opinion.73
3. Final Thoughts on the Rehnquist Court
Throughout his tenure as Chief Justice, William Rehnquist
presided over a sharply divided, incoherent Court. Without a solid
coalition of five (or more) ideologically simpatico Justices, the
Rehnquist Court did not "make a single move that would radically
change or unsettle existing constitutional doctrine."74  Instead, the
confluence of decisionmaking styles on the Rehnquist Court was a
perfect storm for the making of an incoherent Court. Leading (so to
speak) the Court was a pragmatic Chief Justice uninterested in an
" 'overarching substantive theory of constitutional interpretation' "
and willing to sacrifice doctrinal coherence in order to cobble
together a five member majority.75 More significant, two radically
different "swing" Justices typically cast the deciding votes in key
cases-one of whom was a minimalist (whose fact-specific
decisionmaking did not bind her or the other Justices in subsequent
cases); and the other of whom was quite willing to make expansive
statements about doctrine and the judicial role (but felt neither bound
by those principles in subsequent cases nor obligated to contemplate
72. Mark Tushnet, in criticizing O'Connor, put it this way: "A reader [of O'Connor's
opinions] could know what mattered to [her], but often not why it mattered so much-or
so little." Id.
73. On O'Connor's propensity to file concurring opinions, see NANCY MAVEETY,
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR: STRATEGIST ON THE SUPREME COURT 52-68
(1996); and Richard Brust, Balancing Act: Her Constitutional Tests and Strategic
Concurrences Helped Make Sandra Day O'Connor a Force from the Center, A.B.A. J.,
Sept. 2005, at 37, 41. For an extreme example of this practice, see Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S.
952 (1996), in which Justice O'Connor filed a concurrence to a decision that she authored.
See id. at 990-95 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also Jeffrey Rosen, Sandramandered,
NEW REPUBLIC, July 8, 1996, at 6, 6 (condemning O'Connor's "analytically unintelligible"
"contortions").
74. Lawrence Friedman, The Rehnquist Court: Some More or Less Historical
Comments, in THE REHNQUIST COURT: A RETROSPECTIVE 146 (Martin Belsky ed.,
2002); see also supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
75. Rosen, supra note 40, at 87 (quoting Jack Goldsmith); see also supra Part I.A.1
(discussing Rehnquist's willingness to trade off doctrinal coherence for a five-Justice
majority in Glucksberg); infra note 77 and accompanying text.
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precedents at odds with his decisionmaking).76  This mix of
personalities, as the above discussion reveals, was on full display in
Glucksberg and Lawrence.
The Rehnquist Court, while unique in some respects, exemplifies
the tendencies of incoherent Courts. Besides the individual
preferences of the swing Justices, there are other structural
explanations for why an incoherent Court would be less likely to issue
broad opinions or overrule landmark precedents. In order to cobble
together a majority coalition, Justices will often compromise their
individual preferences regarding the reach of the decision.77 As a
result, the "Justices will often deliberately cloud their opinion to
obtain the fifth vote" "so long as the ambiguity is not incompatible
with their views. 78
On an incoherent Court, there are more closely divided cases
and, as a result, more opportunities for Justices in the majority to
make compromises in order to hold together a majority coalition. In
particular, there are more occasions when Justices will ask the
decision writer to address their concerns through addition or deletion
and "tacitly threaten to withhold support if the changes are not
made."79 And when the opinion is being written by a swing Justice, it
may be that other members of the majority coalition place fewer
demands on the opinion writer-for fear that the swing Justice will
drop out of the majority and file a special concurring opinion. 0
Against this backdrop, it is to be expected that the decisions of
76. The question of what animated Justices O'Connor and Kennedy is beyond the
scope of this Article. For a sampling of literature discussing the predelictions of Justices
Kennedy and O'Connor, see supra notes 66-73, infra notes 242-45. See generally TOOBIN,
supra note 31 (sharing various anecdotal and personal insights into the Justices of the
Supreme Court).
77. See generally Frank B. Cross, The Justices of Strategy, 48 DUKE L.J. 511, 521
(1998) (reviewing EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 6) (discussing then-Justice Rehnquist's
"negotiating with John Stevens for a considerable time in order to produce a fifth vote" in
Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976)). In the case of a coherent Court, the
final decision may not reflect the preferences of individual Justices in the majority
coalition. Instead, these Justices may simply defer to the opinion writer. See Bonneau et
al., supra note 64, at 903. At the same time, Justices in the majority coalition of a coherent
Court are both more likely to agree with each other and, therefore, are less likely to
condition their vote on the inclusion or exclusion of certain language from the majority
opinion. This is not to say that bargaining does not take place on a coherent Court; it is to
say that there is less bargaining than one might expect. See id. at 892.
78. See Igor Kirman, Standing Apart To Be a Part: The Precedential Value of Supreme
Court Concurring Opinions, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 2083, 2099 (1995).
79. Forrest Maltzman & Paul J. Wahlbeck, Strategic Policy Considerations and Voting
Fluidity on the Burger Court, 90 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 581, 581 (1996).
80. See supra notes 56-68 and accompanying text (discussing Kennedy's opinion in
Lawrence).
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incoherent Courts will be in tension with each other-the rationales
employed are not necessarily embraced by a majority of Justices,
often muddied by compromise, and cases often turn on factual
distinctions (because the legal rule is not intended to bind the Court
in subsequent cases). This is certainly true of Rehnquist Court
substantive due process decisions, but it is also true in the Court's
decisions on religion, race, and its once-vaunted federalism revival."
One final comment about the Rehnquist Court and, more
generally, incoherent Courts: while such Courts are reluctant to
overturn landmark precedents, stare decisis does not operate as a
significant independent constraint. When convenient, stare decisis is
invoked as a rationale for not overturning precedent. Rehnquist
Court decisions upholding Roe and Miranda v. Arizona,82 for
example, are paeans to precedent.83 At the same time, the very
Justices who wrote these opinions did not blink when overturning
some abortion rulings or gutting much of Miranda's protections.84
Likewise, some Justices (most notably Anthony Kennedy) ignore
precedents-even stare decisis precedents-that stand in the way of
preferred outcomes and rationales.85 None of this is to say that
precedent does not figure into the Justices' deliberation or thinking;86
rather, it is to say that the reluctance of incoherent Courts to overturn
landmark precedents is tied more to the lack of consensus on these
Courts than to the saliency of stare decisis.
81. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text. See generally TUSHNET, supra note
66, at 223-48.
82. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
83. See generally Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)
(upholding Roe); Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (upholding Miranda).
The Court also embraced its power to make and overrule precedent. For example, when
invalidating congressional efforts to overturn Supreme Court decisionmaking through the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the Court emphasized both its power to interpret the
Constitution and the need for Congress to adhere to such Court interpretations. See City
of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1996).
84. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 870 (repudiating the trimester test utilized in Roe and, in so
doing, overturning earlier Court decisions protecting abortion rights); see also Kamisar,
supra note 61, at 106 (describing tension between the Rehnquist Court's gutting of
Miranda and the lopsided (seven to two) rejection of congressional efforts to statutorily
overrule Miranda).
85. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the Supreme Court's Current Doctrine of Stare
Decisis Require Adherence to the Supreme Court's Current Doctrine of Stare Decisis?, 86
N.C. L. REV. 1165, 1168-200 (2008) (discussing incoherence of stare decisis methodology
employed in Casey); supra notes 56-68 and accompanying text.
86. See EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 6, at 28-33 (discussing the Justices' invocation
of precedent in their deliberations).
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B. The Early Warren Court
There were two Warren Courts. The 1962-1968 Terms were, as
Lucas Powe put it, "history's Warren Court."87 That Court, as Part II
will detail, was a coherent Court willing both to overturn precedent
and make significant doctrinal advances. The 1953-1961 Terms tell a
far different story. The Court rarely overturned precedent (eleven
during this period) and was sharply divided.88 Justices Potter Stewart
and Tom Clark generally alternated as the swing Justices for much of
this period.89 But on national security cases, which dominated much
of this period, Justices Felix Frankfurter and John Marshall Harlan
cast the decisive votes. 90
The national security cases are emblematic of the early Warren
Court. Rather than embrace a "hard" view of the Constitution, the
Court made extensive use of constitutional avoidance-permitting
the Justices to initially rule in favor of Communists and other
subversives while allowing themselves the freedom to change their
minds in subsequent cases. And Justices Frankfurter and Harlan did
change their minds-responding to congressional opprobrium by
backing away from their initial pro-civil liberties rulings.
Minimalist decisionmaking also characterizes the two most
significant constitutional rulings of the early Warren Court-Brown
v. Board of Education91 and Baker v. Carr.' In both Brown and
Baker, the Court declared an important principle without ordering
consequential relief. Baker rejected political question objections to
legislative apportionment cases-but left the details of the substantive
doctrine to subsequent cases. Brown, although repudiating separate-
but-equal, left it to southern school systems to devise appropriate
remedies (and the Warren Court subsequently denied certiorari in
related challenges to state antimiscegenation laws). 93 As a result, the
most consequential statements about school desegregation and
legislative apportionment were made by the post-1962 Warren
87. POWE, supra note 1, at 209, 497-99.
88. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
89. See generally Steven Smith, Justices Stewart and Clark: Swing Votes on the Warren
Court, 19 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1009 (1979) (discussing swings from 1958-1960).
90. See Frickey, supra note 18, at 401-02.
91. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (effectively overruling Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537
(1896)).
92. 369 U.S. 186 (1962), overruling Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
93. See Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 885 (1956). For the classic statement of why the Court
had good reason to steer clear of antimiscegenation, see ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 46-60 (1986).
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Court.94 Likewise, it was the post-1962 Warren Court95 that issued
definitive constitutional rulings on antisubversive legislation and, in
so doing, provided expansive civil liberties protections to Communists
and other critics of the government. 6
1. Red Monday and Its Aftermath9'
During its 1956-1957 Term, the Court decided twelve cases
involving Communists, ruling against the government in every case.98
Most significant, on June 17, 1957 (Red Monday), the Court handed
down four decisions that severely limited Smith Act prosecutions (for
the "knowing or willing" "advocacy or teaching" of the "desirability
or propriety of overthrowing the Government of the United
States").99 These decisions, while signaling the unconstitutionality of
governmental efforts to clamp down on subversives, were decided on
statutory grounds."° For example, in Yates v. United States,10' the
Court (in an opinion by Justice Harlan) concluded that the Smith Act
was limited to "incitement" and did not extend to abstract
advocacy.1°2
Congress responded with a vengeance, coming-as Chief Justice
Warren put it-"dangerously close" to enacting legislation that would
94. See POWE, supra note 1, at 239-71 (detailing post-1962 reapportionment cases);
Neal Devins, The Judicial Role in Equality Decisionmaking, in REDEFINING EQUALITY
219, 221 (Neal Devins & Davison M. Douglas eds., 1998) (discussing the sharp divide
between pre- and post-1962 Warren Court school desegregation decisions). For additional
discussion of the pre-post 1962 divide in legislative reapportionment, see THE AMERICAN
CONGRESS: THE BUILDING OF DEMOCRACY 551-53 (Julian E. Zelizer ed., 2004). See
also infra Part II.A.
95. See infra Part II.A.
96. See Frickey, supra note 18, at 426-39. For this very reason, Walter Murphy
described the Warren Court's earlier retreat on anti-Communist legislation as a "tactical
withdrawal, not a rout." WALTER F. MURPHY, CONGRESS AND THE COURT: A CASE
STUDY IN THE AMERICAN POLITICAL PROCESS 246 (1962).
97. The discussion draws from Neal Devins, Should the Court Fear Congress?, 90
MINN. L. REV. 1337, 1342-43 (2006). In that prior essay, I argued that the Court had good
reason to fear congressional retaliation. See id. at 1348-58. The following analysis
represents a partial rethinking of my position in that prior paper. Here I make a
somewhat different argument--emphasizing that the Justices who switched positions in
anti-Communist cases had weak policy preferences. Cf. id.
98. PowE, supra note 1, at 90-91 (summarizing cases dealing with Communism during
the 1956-1957 Term).
99. 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (2000) (criminalizing the "knowing or willing ... advocacy or
teaching ... [of the] desirability or propriety of overthrowing the Government of the
United States").
100. See generally Frickey, supra note 18 (describing the early Warren Court's
constitutional avoidance tendencies).
101. 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
102. Id. at 313.
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have stripped the Supreme Court of appellate jurisdiction in five
domestic security areas.' °3 The Court relented, issuing decisions that
limited the scope of earlier rulings and otherwise permitted the
government to prosecute subversive cases.'O In Barenblatt v. United
States 05 for example, the Court (in a quite different Harlan opinion)
upheld a six-month contempt-of-Congress sentence for a witness's
refusal to answer questions before the House Un-American Activities
Committee.0 6 Concluding that personal liberties must be balanced
against pressing public needs, the Court backed away from Yates and
other Red Monday decisions. The fact that the Court did this after
the defeat of proposed jurisdiction-stripping measures was significant,
prompting The New York Times, for example, to complain that "what
Senator Jenner [the principal sponsor of court-stripping legislation]
was unable to achieve [in Congress] the Supreme Court has now
virtually accomplished on its own."107
The New York Times had good reason to highlight the curious
timing of the Court's retreat. At the same time, the retreat was
hardly that of the entire Court, which was sharply divided on national
security cases. Pro-civil liberties cases in the 1956-1957 Term were
often decided by a vote of five to four. Following the Court's retreat,
the Court was again divided, often deciding cases five to four.108 The
real retreat, in other words, was the work of the Court's centrist
Justices-John Marshall Harlan and especially Felix Frankfurter. 109
Consider, for example, Justice Frankfurter: from 1959-1962, he cast
only one dissenting vote on a national security case (and that case was
"nonconsequential, nonconstitutional")." 1
103. EARL WARREN, THE MEMOIRS Of EARL WARREN 313 (1977).
104. See THOMAS M. KECK, THE MOST ACTIVIST SUPREME COURT IN HISTORY 48-
66 (2004) (discussing the Court's retreat and the related scholarly debate about the
Court's role in checking governmental excess); POWE, supra note 1, at 235-56.
105. 360 U.S. 109 (1959)
106. Id. at 134.
107. MURPHY, supra note 96, at 245 (quoting Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1960, at
36:1).
108. See Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, Decisional Trends on the Warren and
Burger Courts: Results from the Supreme Court Data Base Project, 73 JUDICATURE 103,
104 ("[A] vote of 5-4 decided 23 of the 52 non-unanimous civil liberties decisions.").
109. See Frickey, supra note 18, at 432-37.
110. POWE, supra note 1, at 142. For this and other reasons, Frankfurter was described
as the leader of the Court's cautious wing. See William Eskridge, Civil Rights Legislation
in the 1990s: Reneging on History? Playing the Court/Congress/President Civil Rights
Game, 79 CAL. L. REV. 613, 619 n.28 (1991); see also infra note 117 and accompanying text
(discussing Frankfurter's judicial philosophy).
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2. Constitutional Avoidance and the External Strategic Actor
In theory, a strategic, policy-oriented Court might make use of
constitutional avoidance in ways quite similar to the pre-1962 Warren
Court. For example, recognizing potential political backlash to pro-
Communist rulings, the Court might have used avoidance to return
the issue to Congress. In particular, if Congress did not countermand
the Court, the Justices would understand that they could be more
aggressive in their pursuit of favored policies-grounding their
decisions in the Constitution and thereby making it harder for
Congress (through legislation) and future Courts (through statutory
interpretation) to advance a competing policy agenda. In contrast, if
their decisions did prompt a legislative backlash, the Court could beat
a strategic retreat. It could defuse congressional backlash by
interpreting subsequent statutes in ways that lawmakers supported
(and hold off on reaching the constitutional questions until the
political climate was more favorable).
The question remains: was the Warren Court's retreat strategic?
My past writings argued that the 1957 Warren Court had reason to
fear Congress-and that it would have been sensible for a "strategic"
Justice to take into account Court-curbing proposals."' Whether or
not this earlier analysis is correct, such strategic behavior played little
or no role in explaining the Court's retreat. Instead, the Warren
Court's flip-flop speaks more to the pre-1962 Warren Court's
incoherence than anything else.
To start, a Justice truly committed to the policy goals of 1956-
1957 Term civil liberties decisions would have run the risk that
Congress would strike back at the Court. This explains the
willingness of Justices Black, Douglas, Brennan, and Warren to
oppose the Court's retreat-often filing vociferous dissents.112  In
particular, the 1960 Court had reason to think that Congress would
acquiesce to pro-civil liberties rulings. Earlier Court-curbing
proposals failed, and the Court controversy was not a major factor in
the 1958 elections.113 More significantly, "the Congress became more
liberal. Seven Republican Senators who had battled the Court,
111. See Devins, supra note 97, at 1343-44; see also MURPHY, supra note 96, at 246
(defending the Court's retreat as "tactical"); Frickey, supra note 18, at 431-32 (describing
the Court's reaction to Congressional criticism).
112. See KECK, supra note 104, at 53-54 (discussing Justice Black's dissent in
Barenblatt and Black's subsequent public statements about the failings of the Harlan-
Frankfurter balancing test).
113. Frickey, supra note 18, at 431.
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including Jenner, ... had left due either to retirement or electoral
defeat."1 4
But for Justice Frankfurter (and presumably his ally, Justice
Harlan),115 the hue and cry following the Court's 1956-1957 Term
rulings was too much. Not only did Congress seek to slap the Court
down, the American Bar Association and Judge Learned Hand
launched sharp attacks against the Court.1 6 Frankfurter was a pro-
government New Dealer who sought to limit judicial intrusions into
the legislative process by advancing any number of "judicial restraint"
doctrines."7 His antigovernment decisions were a departure from this
norm and, as such, there is reason to think that he was not strongly
committed to the civil liberties agenda championed by Black,
Douglas, Warren, and Brennan. By retreating from 1956-1957 Term
decisions and returning to his typical mode of decisionmaking, he was
able to demonstrate his bona fides to Court critics." 8
To summarize, the Court's retreat from 1956-1957 Term rulings
is not a story of a Court acting strategically-by issuing minimalist
nonconstitutional decisions in an effort to best assess how to advance
its pro-civil liberties agenda. Instead, the Harlan/Frankfurter flip and
the vociferous criticism of that flip by pro-civil liberties Justices
speaks to divergent preferences on an incoherent Court. Frankfurter
and Harlan had weak preferences and, as such, were not truly aligned
with the Court's four liberals (Warren, Douglas, Black, and
Brennan). That Frankfurter and Harlan preferred nonconstitutional
decisions in the 1956-1957 Term speaks to those weak preferences;
114. Id. (citing MURPHY, supra note 96, at 237-38).
115. On the allegiance between Harlan and Frankfurter, see KECK, supra note 104, at
53 (describing Harlan as Frankfurter's "closest ally"); and POWE, supra note 1, at 143
(describing Harlan as "closely associated" with Frankfurter, pointing to a Harlan opinion
as "Frankfurter lite").
116. See POWE, supra note 1, at 127-34; Frickey, supra note 18, at 431-32.
117. Frankfurter was known for deference to elected officials, state judges, and
Congress; he was not known for engaging issues on a constitutional level (another reason
why Frankfurter would have been predisposed to making use of avoidance in lieu of
constitutional rulings). 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 389-90 (Thomas
T. Lewis & Richard L. Wilson eds., 2001). Correspondingly, Frankfurter believed that
mores and police power were the proper locus of power and, as such, he was especially
upset when allegations of judicial activism were levied against the Warren Court (another
reason why Frankfurter would have been especially sensitive to the criticisms of the bar,
Congress, and Judge Hand). See id.
118. For a treatment of the desire of Justices to seek approval from "audiences" that
matter to them, see generally LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A
PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (2006). See also id. at 42, 44 (noting Learned
Hand's influence on Frankfurter, as well as Frankfurter's desire to portray himself as a
civil libertarian committed to judicial restraint).
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their willingness to flip in response to anti-Court criticism by
Congress, the bar, and respected jurists also speaks to those weak
preferences.'19
Finally, there is a link between the discussions of the Rehnquist
and early Warren Courts. Just as the Justices on the Rehnquist Court
compromised with each other in order to piece together five-member
majority coalitions, the early Warren Court likewise compromised in
the first round of antisubversive cases. Unable to get five Justices
willing to strike down governmental conduct on constitutional
grounds, the "divided and besieged set of Justices avoided the
sharpest confrontations with each other by agreeing to issue
indeterminate opinions.""12  These decisions, in other words,
announced results and did not make law. The Court's swing Justices
could peel away from the pro-civil liberties coalition without
admitting error. Equally telling is that following the
Frankfurter/Harlan flip, the Court's four liberals-no longer needing
to compromise with the swing Justices-could now issue strongly
worded dissents, dissents that reveal that this group of Justices
formed an ideologically simpatico coalition. For the Warren Court,
as the next part will detail, 1962 proved to be the defining year. Felix
Frankfurter retired and Arthur Goldberg took his seat; this change in
the Court's composition was transforming. No longer incoherent, the
Court could aggressively pursue a coherent vision of the law.
II. COHERENT COURTS
The post-1962 Warren and New Deal (1937-1949) Courts
exemplify coherent Courts. Five or more Justices on these Courts
were ideologically simpatico and pursued a shared vision of legal
policymaking. Sometimes that meant overturning landmark
constitutional precedents; sometimes that meant embracing novel
legal doctrines. The post-1962 Warren Court overturned thirty-two
constitutional precedents in the 1962-1968 Terms (thirty of which
119. In arguing that the Court did not act strategically, I am not making the stronger
claim that strategic concerns did not figure into the calculus of any Justice. For example,
Justices Frankfurter and Harlan may well have seen their flip as a mechanism for the
Court to improve relationships with Congress. At the same time, these Justices were less
interested in advancing a pro-civil liberties agenda than were the Court's four liberals.
Frankfurter, in particular, was a strong proponent of judicial restraint. See KECK, supra
note 104, at 38-66. Thinking that the Court should only invalidate laws that
"unambiguous[ly]" violated the Constitution, Frankfurter regularly put his views of the
judicial role in front of his preferred policy outcomes. Id. at 45. In this way, Frankfurter's
approach to judging does not jibe with the policy-driven strategic actor model.
120. Frickey, supra note 18, at 401.
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advanced liberal outcomes). 2' The Warren Court, moreover,
advanced its nationalistic agenda through a series of doctrinal
innovations-constitutionalizing criminal procedure and
fundamentally revamping the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
The New Deal Court overturned thirty-two decisions from 1937-1946
(nearly all of which advanced the New Deal Court's embrace of
economic regulation).122 By freeing the government's hand to
regulate economic matters, moreover, the New Deal Court
transformed the work of the Supreme Court-moving it away from
economic issues and towards civil rights and liberties. Consider, for
example, the 1935 Term (immediately before the start of the New
Deal Court). Unlike the modern era, the 1935 Court heard only two
(out of 160) cases that implicated civil rights and liberties.123
In explaining post-1962 Warren and New Deal Court
decisionmaking, this Article both provides some details of ideological
cohesion among the Justices of these two Courts and takes a closer
look at an exemplary decision from each Court. For the Warren
Court, this Article looks at Miranda-a case that showcased the
Warren Court's willingness to hand down prophylactic rules that
looked more like statutes than judicial edicts. For the New Deal
Court, it discusses Wickard v. Filburn,'124 a case in which the Court
self-consciously abandoned its authority to check Congress's
Commerce Clause powers.
A. The Second Warren Court
"History's Warren Court," the Court that "virtually rewrote the
corpus of our constitutional law," began with the 1962 appointment of
Arthur Goldberg. 25 In sharp contrast to Felix Frankfurter (the
Justice whose seat Goldberg filled), Goldberg was self-consciously
121. Ringhand, supra note 16, at 1075-77. Likewise, from 1962-1968, sixty-six state
statutes were invalidated. Sixty-two of these invalidations advanced liberal outcomes. Id.
at 1058-61.
122. See WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 213-36 (1995); see also
Christopher P. Banks, The Supreme Court and Precedent: An Analysis of Natural Courts
and Reversal Trends, 75 JUDICATURE 262, 265-66 (1992); infra Part II.B (discussing other
measures of the New Deal Court's willingness to overturn precedent).
123. LEUCHENTBURG, supra note 122, at 235.
124. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
125. MICHAEL BELKNAP, THE SUPREME COURT UNDER EARL WARREN 1953-69, at
308 (2005) (quoting THE BURGER COURT: COUNTER REVOLUTION OR
CONFIRMATION? 261 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1998)).
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liberal and activist. 26  Together with Warren, Douglas, Black, and
Brennan, Goldberg gave the Court five secure votes for liberal
outcomes. Goldberg (and Abe Fortas, the Justice who replaced
Goldberg in 1966) agreed with Warren about ninety percent of the
time, and the intra-agreement rate among the five liberals likewise
hovered around ninety percent. 127 When Thurgood Marshall joined
the Court in 1967 (replacing Tom Clark), the Court moved even
further to the left."2 Marshall was in the majority ninety-five percent
of the time (second only to Brennan who was in the majority ninety-
eight percent of the time), and the intra-agreement rate among "the
most cohesive bloc in modern Court history" (Fortas, Warren,
Brennan, and Marshall) was near ninety-three percent. 129
Ideological cohesion within the Warren Court played out in
innumerable ways. More than any Court before it, the Warren Court
was willing to overturn constitutional precedent. 3 ° Correspondingly,
the Warren Court was not especially concerned with the niceties of
doctrinal consistency; instead, it was much more focused on reaching
preferred outcomes. Mark Tushnet describes this as the "willfulness"
of the Court: its willingness to reach the "correct" result even when
the "doctrinal tools ... were not readily at hand."'' For example,
rather than engage in a high-minded debate about whether the
Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Bill of Rights, the Warren
Court thought it good public policy to mandate that the states be
subject to the same Bill of Rights limits as the federal government. It
did not "bother[] to come up with a decent theory supporting [this
conclusion], because the Warren Court's members were not
concerned with constitutional theory."'3 Perhaps for this reason, the
126. POWE, supra note 1, at 211-12. On the question of whether 1961 or 1962 is the
critical year, see supra note 1. See also Kermit L. Hall, The Warren Court: Yesterday,
Today, and Tomorrow, 28 IND. L. REV. 309, 312 (1995) (suggesting that there was
"ideological continuity" throughout the Warren era).
127. POWE, supra note 1, at 212. A more empirically minded study places the
agreement rate among Warren, Goldberg, Brennan, and Douglas near eighty-seven
percent. See Edward V. Heck, Justice Brennan and the Heyday of Warren Court
Liberalism, 20 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 841, 845 (1980).
128. Eskridge, supra note 110, at 619-20 n.28.
129. Heck, supra note 127, at 872; see also POWE, supra note 1, at 290. Justice
Douglas-who had a propensity to file lone dissents-regularly voted for liberal outcomes
but had a lower intra-agreement score. Heck, supra note 127, at 872.
130. BELKNAP, supra note 125, at 308.
131. Tushnet, supra note 1, at 10.
132. Id. at 18. Tushnet's conclusion is shared by both supporters and opponents of
Warren Court innovations. Consider, for example, Griswold v Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965). Robert Bork condemned Griswold for its lawlessness, arguing that it-like many
other Warren Court decisions-"fail[ed] every test of neutrality" and, as such, the decision
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Warren Court saw little reason to ground their doctrinal innovations
in past precedent and, as such, cited fewer precedents than other
Supreme Courts.'33
The ideological coherence (and corresponding ambitiousness) of
the Warren Court is also reflected in the ways in which the Court
pursued its policymaking agenda. The Court rewrote constitutional
law and, in critical respects, the Court was more ambitious in
pursuing its liberal agenda than were Congress and the White House
(even during the Johnson administration, when Democrats controlled
both Congress and the White House). The key to all this was Earl
Warren who, as Bernard Schwartz observed, "strongly believed that
the law must draw its vitality from life rather than precedent" and
that the Court needed "to perform a transforming role, usually
thought of as more appropriate to the legislator than the judge" in
order for the Court "to keep step with the twentieth century's frenetic
pace of social change." '134 In particular, Warren and the dominant
coalition on the post-1962 Court aggressively pursued the
nationalization of political problems and processes, especially
equality for the underrepresented (minorities, the poor, the accused,
and children). 3 ' In so doing, the Court opened up areas that had
"been thought closed to the exercise of judicial power,' 3 6 often
"articulating broad rules that went well beyond the particular
circumstances of individual cases.' 137
Consider, for example, the ways in which the post-1962 Warren
Court extended the doctrinal innovations of the pre-1962 Warren
Court. In Brown, the pre-1962 Court declared a basic principle but
then left it to southern school systems to sort out how to put that
was an "unprincipled" effort of the Justices to impose their value choices on elected
officials. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47
IND. L.J. 1, 9 (1971). Defenders of the Warren Court's reinvigoration of the right to
privacy are also critical of the Court's reasoning. Most significant (and consistent with
Mark Tushnet's claim about the Court's interest in getting to "yes"-and not worrying
about constitutional theory), David Garrow's review of the Justices' internal deliberations
revealed that several Warren Court Justices were searching for a theory to back their
conclusion that Connecticut's ban on contraceptives was unconstitutional. DAVID J.
GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY 245-50 (1994).
133. See Fowler & Jeon, supra note 2, at 3, 7.
134. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 275,263 (1993).
135. See RICHARD Y. FUNSTON, CONSTITUTIONAL COUNTERREVOLUTION? 297-307
(1977); see also sources cited in Kermit L. Hall, The Warren Court in Historical
Perspective, in THE WARREN COURT: A RETROSPECTIVE 293-95 (Bernard Schwartz ed.,
1996).
136. FUNSTON, supra note 135, at 314.
137. Barbara Palmer, Issue Fluidity and Agenda Setting on the Warren Court, 52 POL.
RES. Q. 39, 42 (1999) (citation omitted).
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principle into action. 38  "[O]ne decade after Brown, only [two
percent] of black children attended biracial schools in the eleven
southern states."' 39  In an effort to make the Brown decision
consequential, the post-1962 Warren Court reentered the fray,
declaring in 1964 that "[t]he time for mere 'deliberate speed' has run
out"'" and rejecting, in 1968, freedom of choice plans that allowed
white and African American students to opt into one-race schools. 41
Likewise, the post-1962 Court dramatically extended the reach of
Baker v. Carr142 (which simply held justiciable legal challenges to
legislative apportionment schemes). In Reynolds v. Sims,143 the Court
declared voting a fundamental right and established the "one person,
one vote" principle. 144 In so doing, the Court effectively put in issue
"[ninety] percent of the districts in the House of Representatives....
[and] virtually every single seat in the upper houses of state
legislatures and most of the seats in lower houses.' 1 45 The decision
was so far-reaching that Anthony Lewis, Supreme Court
correspondent for The New York Times, observed that "[e]ven some
liberal-minded persons, admirers of the modern Supreme Court,
found themselves stunned. 146
The Court's willingness to push the limits of earlier doctrinal
innovations calls attention to another central feature of post-1962
Warren Court decisionmaking. On the one hand, the Court was a
product of its times. Elected government and the American people
had become more liberal-so much so that some have argued that the
post-1962 Warren Court became "politically in tune with the liberal
changes that were about to sweep the country"'47 and that "the Court
138. See J. Harvie Wilkinson, The Supreme Court and Southern School Desegregation,
1955-1970. A History and Analysis, 64 VA. L. REv. 485 (1978) (discussing the South's
response to Brown 11, 349 U.S. 294 (1955), the Court's decision to leave the
implementation of Brown to Southern school officials and district court judges).
139. Neal Devins, What Brown Teaches Us About the Rehnquist Court's Federalism
Revival, PS: POL. SCI. & POL., Apr. 2004, at 212.
140. Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 234 (1964) (quoting Brown v. Bd. of
Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955)).
141. Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438 (1968).
142. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
143. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
144. Id. at 558.
145. POWE, supra note 1, at 252; see also THE AMERICAN CONGRESS: THE BUILDING
OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 94, at 549-51 (noting that Reynolds is a dramatic extension
of Baker and attributing that extension to Goldberg's replacement of Frankfurter).
146. Anthony Lewis, Supreme Court Moves Again To Exert Its Powerful Influence,
N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 1964, at E3.
147. Gerald N. Rosenberg, Bringing Politics Back In, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 309, 311
(2000) (reviewing POWE, supra note 1).
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was a functioning part of the Kennedy-Johnson liberalism of the mid-
and late-1960s."''  For example, Baker was universally applauded,
and Congress backed Brown by enacting landmark civil rights
legislation, most notably the Civil Rights Act of 1964.' 9 At the same
time, the Court tested the limits of what elected government and the
American people would tolerate. The post-1962 Warren Court's push
towards numerical measures of racial equality in the schools, its "one
person, one vote" standard, its constitutionalization of criminal law,
and much more did not resonate with elected officials or the
American people.' Indeed, Richard Nixon and George Wallace's
1968 presidential bids both took aim at Supreme Court liberalism.'
As such, the post-1962 Warren Court's liberal majority was willing to
run risks, "to be in tension with the dominant political culture. 1 52
The post-1962 Warren Court's willingness to test limits, to go as far as
it could in advancing its vision of legal policymaking, is a hallmark of
a coherent Court. 153
1. Goodbye Constitutional Avoidance; Hello Prophylactic Rules
If the hallmark of the first Warren Court was its use of
constitutional avoidance in antisubversive cases,'54 the post-1962
Warren Court demonstrated its willingness to impose a hard view of
148. POWE, supra note 1, at 494.
149. On Baker, see ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 85-86 (1990); and
POWE, supra note 1, at 203-05. On the relationship between the 1964 Civil Rights Act and
the Court's ruling in Brown, see Neal Devins, Judicial Matters, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1027,
1032-34 (1992) (reviewing GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS
BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991)).
150. For example, the Warren Court also revolutionized the First Amendment-
liberalizing obscenity standards, limiting libel prosecutions, and striking down loyalty
oaths. See POWE, supra note 1, at 303-21, 336-57.
151. See William G. Ross, The Role of Judicial Issues in Presidential Campaigns, 42
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 391, 434-37 (2002) (concluding that "[j]udicial issues may have
influenced the outcome of the 1968 election more than any other election in the nation's
history").
152. Hall, supra note 126, at 327.
153. In this way, the Warren Court was not especially interested in having a true
dialogue with Congress. Instead, it pushed its agenda as far as it could go-seeking to
avoid a legislative countermand but willing to craft doctrine in ways that did not match
legislative preferences. See Neal Devins in Phillip P. Frickey et al., Congress and the Earl
Warren Court, BULLETIN OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY 15-16 (Summer 2004), available
at http://www.amacad.org/publications/bulletin/summer2004/scheiber.pdf (examining the
Court's willingness to use a Reconstruction-era civil rights statute to advance a broader
vision of fair housing rights than the just-enacted fair housing legislation). This Article's
conclusion notes this type of decisionmaking tracks one of the models of judicial
decisionmaking advanced by political scientists, the external strategic actor. See supra
note 11; see infra notes 158, 174.
154. See supra notes 87-96 and accompanying text.
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legal policymaking by embracing prophylactic rules-rules intended
to bind lower courts and government officials (even if it meant
sometimes prohibiting otherwise constitutional behavior).155 This bit
of constitutional bravado highlights the fundamental differences
between pre- and post-1962 Warren Court decisionmaking. The post-
1962 Court knew its mind on legal policy questions and, as such, was
willing to bind itself, lower courts, and government officials.
Consequently, instead of invoking the avoidance canon when
considering the legality of antisubversive legislation, the post-1962
Warren Court "brought the domestic-security apparatus to a halt,' 15 6
declaring unconstitutional federal laws banning Communists from
working in defense facilities and limiting the mailing of "communist
propaganda." '157 More than that, the post-1962 Court was willing to
risk elected-branch disapproval in order to advance their legal policy
agenda.158
Miranda v. Arizona is the quintessential example of the post-
1962 Warren Court's willingness to run risks and pursue its vision of
legal policymaking. Notwithstanding public opinion polls showing
significant opposition to post-1962 Warren Court criminal procedure
decisions and the calls by twenty-seven states (in an amicus brief) for
the Court to slow down its criminal procedure revolution,'59 Miranda
mandated a specific set of warnings that police must read to criminal
suspects.' 6° In so doing, the Court required every state to change its
interrogation practices.' 61 More than that, the decision read like a
legislative code, not a constitutional opinion.162 Correspondingly, in
155. See infra notes 159-66 and accompanying text.
156. POWE, supra note 1, at 316.
157. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 263-64 (1967); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen.,
381 U.S. 301, 306-07 (1965).
158. The question remains: were the Justices simply voting their policy preferences or
did they make a strategic decision to advance the law as far as they could without risking
legislative override? Attitudinalists embrace the former view; the external strategic actor
model embraces the latter view. Compare SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 6, at 86-97, with
EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 6, at 9-18. For additional discussion, see infra note 174
(discussing the criminal procedure scale back).
159. POWE, supra note 1, at 394-95.
160. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473 (1966).
161. Fowler & Jeon, supra note 2, at 29. For this reason, Miranda is described as
"hands down" the post-1962 Warren Court's most controversial criminal procedure
decision, if not "the most controversial decision by the Warren Court." POWE, supra note
1, at 394. Measures of precedential salience likewise see Miranda as a defining decision
for the post-1962 Warren Court. See Fowler & Jeon, supra note 2, at 28-29.
162. See Francis A. Allen, The Judicial Quest for Penal Justice: The Warren Court and
the Criminal Cases, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 518, 532 (describing Miranda as a "legislative-like
directive[ ]").
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overturning the long-standing totality of the circumstances test, the
Court gave "disproportionate attention" to matters of policy, not
law.163 Among other things, the Court began by announcing a new
rule "so specific that there could be no claim that [it] flowed directly
from the text of the Constitution." 6" More striking, by embracing a
prophylactio rule, 65 the Court concluded that it was better (as a
matter of policy) to foreclose some constitutionally permissible
interrogations in order to stop unconstitutional interrogations.166
In understanding the Court's willingness to impose its views on
elected officials and the police, defenders of Miranda highlight the
"failure of other agencies of law to assume responsibility for
regulating police practices."'67 Also, because of his experiences as
Attorney General of California, Chief Justice Warren invested
significant energy in constitutionalizing criminal procedure. 168 From
1958-1962, the Court decided fourteen criminal cases-ruling for the
liberal bloc in only six of these cases.169 When Warren stepped down,
over a fifth of the Court's docket consisted of criminal cases-with
the post-1962 Warren Court regularly ruling in favor of criminal
suspects. 170 For this very reason, we now "speak of 'constitutional
criminal procedure' instead of simply 'criminal procedure.' "171
The Warren Court's federalization of criminal procedure is a
hallmark both to its legal policy agenda and to the ability of a
coherent Court to advance such an agenda. A strong advocate for
those who were poorly served by the political process, the Court
163. G. EDWARD WHITE, EARL WARREN: A PUBLIC LIFE 269 (1982). Likewise, John
Marshall Harlan (one of the four dissenters in Miranda) expressed strong disapproval of
the Court's handiwork. In the conference following oral arguments, he argued that the
Court was "repudiating 'all our precedents and history,' " that the Court's " 'radical'
innovation" should take place only after" 'more empirical data' "was assembled, and that
the Court should " 'leave law reform to others.' " BELKNAP, supra note 125, at 245
(quoting Justice Harlan).
164. POWE, supra note 1, at 395.
165. On the Warren Court's tendency to issue per se (or prophylactic) rules, see Allen,
supra note 162, at 532; and Brian K. Landsberg, Safeguarding Constitutional Rights: The
Uses and Limits of Prophylactic Rules, 66 TENN. L. REV. 925, 932-39 (1999).
166. See Landsberg, supra note 165, at 933-34.
167. Anthony Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal
Cases, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 785,790 (1970).
168. Yale Kamisar, How Earl Warren's Twenty-Two Years in Law Enforcement
Affected His Work as Chief Justice, in EARL WARREN AND THE WARREN COURT: THE
LEGACY IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN LAW 91, 93-112 (Harry N. Scheiber ed., 2007).
169. Steven Smith, Justices Stewart and Clark: Swing Votes on the Warren Court, 19
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1009, 1025-26 (1979).
170. Fowler & Jeon, supra note 2, at 30.
171. Steven F. Smith, Taking Lessons from the Left?: Judicial Activism on the Right, 1
GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 57, 59 (2002).
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pursued doctrinal innovations to protect racial minorities, the poor,
the accused, juveniles, religious minorities, political dissidents, and
underrepresented voters. In so doing, the Court cared about
results-not legal niceties (such as adhering to or even citing
precedent).7 2  More than that, the Court embraced politically
unpopular targets.173 And after turning itself into an election issue, a
majority coalition of five Justices-while scaling back on their
controversial criminal procedure revolution' 74 -nonetheless proved
willing to risk elected-government backlash in order to pursue that
which they thought was right."'
172. See supra notes 131-37 and accompanying text.
173. Consider, for example, the Court's nationalization of criminal procedure. Fred
Graham wrote about the remarkable "coincidence in timing between the rise in crime,
violence[,] and racial tensions ... and the Supreme Court's campaign to strengthen the
rights of criminal suspects against the state." FRED GRAHAM, THE SELF INFLICTED
WOUND 4 (1970).
174. See Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court and Criminal Justice, in THE WARREN
COURT: A RETROSPECTIVE, supra note 135, at 116-17 (suggesting a scale back in
criminal procedure during the final two years of the Warren Court); see also Paul G.
Cassell, The Statute That Time Forgot: 18 U.S. C. § 3501 and the Overhauling of Miranda,
85 IOWA L. REV. 175, 194-97 (1999) (discussing congressional efforts to override
Miranda). The willingness of the Warren Court to scale back its criminal procedure
revolution suggests that the Justices were sensitive to possible elected branch reprisals
and, as such, provides some support for the external strategic actor model. For additional
discussion, see infra text accompanying note 224.
175. The willingness of a coherent Court to take risks tracks the theory of groupthink.
Most famously explored by Irving Janis, groupthink is characterized as the decisionmaking
process that often takes place in highly cohesive groups such that individual members of
the group fail to identify and explore alternative decisions that could be more rational or
effective in order to avoid disrupting group cohesion. IRVING JANIS, VICTIMS OF
GROUPTHINK: A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONS AND
FIASCOS 9 (1972). This desire not to disrupt the group's general agreement can arise out
of fear of angering other members of the group, or even fear of the possibility of
embarrassment for voicing an unacceptable opinion. See id. at 3. Janis defined
groupthink as follows: "A mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply
involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members' strivings for unanimity override their
motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action." Id. at 9. In the context
of a cohesive Court, groupthink might be manifested in several ways. As already noted,
Justices on a coherent Court are likely to vigorously pursue their shared ideological
agenda-perhaps at the expense of exploring alternatives that are less likely to provoke a
public outcry. Perhaps more significant, Justices on a coherent Court are more likely to
defer to the views of the opinion writer--even if they would write a different opinion
themselves. Specifically, Justices on a coherent Court, by definition, are part of a voting
block of five or more Justices. Consequently, these Justices are more apt to sign on to
opinions with which they do not fully agree, but with which their disagreement is not
powerful enough to warrant disrupting the solid coalition of Justices of which the
particular Justice is a member. Empirical studies of opinion assignment in the second
Warren Court track this claim. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text (discussing the
work of Forrest Maltzman and Paul J. Wahelbeck).
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B. The New Deal Court
The power of the President and the Senate to use their
appointment and confirmation powers to transform Supreme Court
decisionmaking were on full display during the New Deal Court from
1937 to 1949.176 In 1938, President Roosevelt put two final nails into
the coffin of the Lochner era,177 replacing two of the Court's
staunchest proponents of laissez-faire (Justices Willis Van Devanter
and George Sutherland) with New Dealers Hugo Black and Stanley
Reed.17 These appointments guaranteed that the Court, in fact,
would uphold both federal and state efforts to regulate the
economy-something that it had just begun to do (with Owen
Roberts's apparent defection from laissez-faire in the wake of
Roosevelt's 1936 electoral landslide). 179 By 1940, Roosevelt further
176. For sources detailing Roosevelt's appointments to the Supreme Court, see
generally ALBERT P. BLAUSTEIN & ROY M. MERKY, THE FIRST ONE HUNDRED
JUSTICES (1978); CLARE CUSHMAN, THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: ILLUSTRATED
BIOGRAPHIES 1789-1993, at 376-420 (1993); and III-V THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT: THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS (Leon Friedman & Fred
L. Israel eds., 1995).
177. The Lochner era (1890-1937) is a period in which the Court often struck down
state and federal efforts to regulate the economy by, among other things, limiting the
reach of Congress's commerce power and reading economic liberties into the Constitution.
For an excellent overview of this period, see generally HOWARD GILLMAN, THE
CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS
JURISPRUDENCE (1993).
178. Van Devanter and Sutherland were two of the so-called Four Hoursemen, "a
quartet of adamantly conservative judges whose ideas had been molded in the heyday of
laissez-fare in the late nineteenth century, voting" together to "[strike] down more
important socioeconomic legislation than at any time in history." LEUCHTENBURG, supra
note 122, at 168. For a competing perspective of these Justices, see BARRY CUSHMAN,
RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT 34-43 (1998) (highlighting the profound role of
legislative drafting in the pre-1937 Court's repudiation of early New Deal reforms). My
previous writings have highlighted the importance of lawyering-while also calling
attention to the profoundly important role of the 1936 elections in the so-called switch-in-
time. See Neal Devins, Government Lawyers and the New Deal, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 237,
250-54 (1996).
179. When Roberts joined the liberals on the Court, he joined a coherent bloc of
Justices. The liberals had joined together in dissent when the Court was invalidating New
Deal reforms and, after the Roberts switch, continued to vote as a "tight bloc; they had to
remain cohesive in order to muster a majority." Russell W. Galloway, Jr., The Third
Period of the Warren Court: Liberal Dominance (1962-1969), 20 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
773, 788 n.22 (1980).
On the question of whether Roberts was moved by external forces (the Court-
packing plan or the 1936 elections) or internal forces (better lawyering or better legislative
drafting), see CUSHMAN, supra note 178, at 84-105 (using "minimum wage cases" to
highlight internal forces in explaining Justice Roberts's so-called switch-in-time);
LEUCHETENBURG, supra note 122, at 132-62 (highlighting the Court-packing plan); and
Devins, supra note 178, at 250-67 (rejecting Court packing as the source of the switch and
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solidified his New Deal Court with three more appointments to the
Court. By 1943, eight of the nine Justices were FDR appointees. The
consequence of all this: the shift away from demanding judicial
scrutiny of economic regulation was more than guaranteed; in its
stead, the Court turned its attention towards individual rights.
The series of events culminating in the formation of the New
Deal Court began with the 1935-1936 power struggle between the
"Old Court" and Roosevelt over the fate of the New Deal. The New
Deal, proclaimed Roosevelt, "implied that the Government itself was
going to use affirmative action to bring about its avowed objectives
... [and] that a new order of things designed to benefit the great mass
... would replace the old order of special privilege." ' 0 "Swept into
office with a mandate to repair the ravages of the Depression,"18'
Congress and the White House set about to revamp the relationship
between the federal government and the American people-pushing
through (sometimes sight unseen, sometimes with less than an hour of
debate) poorly designed legislative reforms. 8 ' For the Supreme
Court, New Deal initiatives were met with skepticism. The Court
began to hear cases involving federal legislation in December 1934,
and it quickly became clear that the administration would "pa[y] the
costs of sloppy procedures [and] poor draftsmanship," especially
given a cohesive four-Justice bloc of conservatives who "despised the
New Deal program as anti-American and socialistic and condemned
it out of hand as unconstitutional." '83 More to the point: one of the
Court's two moderates (typically Associate Justice Owen Roberts but
arguing that Roberts was moved by both the 1936 elections and lawyering/legislative
drafting).
For the purposes of this Article, it does not matter which account is correct. No
one disputes that FDR's nominees were like-minded on the question of economic
regulation and, as such, operated as a coherent Court. Likewise, there is good reason to
question whether Roberts's 1937 switch, by itself, would have resulted in a fundamental
retooling of Court doctrine. As Bill Ross observed: "[Roberts and Hughes] remained
more restrained in their doctrinal positions than did their more liberal brethren" and,
consequently, the New Deal Court's embrace of economic legislation was a by-product of
"death and resignations produc[ing] numerous vacancies that Roosevelt was able to fill
with justices who did not disappoint him." WILLIAM G. ROSS, THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP
OF CHARLES EVANS HUGHES: 1930-1941, at 134, 136 (2007).
180. Introduction, 2 PUB. PAPERS 3,5 (Nov. 1, 1937).
181. PETER H. IRONS, THE NEW DEAL LAWYERS 3 (1982).
182. LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 122, at 32-33 (discussing the enactment of the
Railroad Retirement Act whose provisions were questioned by the President before
signing).
183. MELVIN I. UROFSKY, THE WARREN COURT: JUSTICES, RULINGS, AND LEGACY
4 (2001).
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sometimes Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes) joined the
conservative bloc to rule against New Deal initiatives."
When Roosevelt was able to seize control of the Court in 1937, a
coherent Court advanced his New Deal agenda by overturning
precedent and pursuing doctrinal innovations that insulated
governmental efforts to regulate the economy. From 1937 to 1944,
the New Deal Court had created a "new constitutional order,"
overruling thirty cases-"two-thirds as many as had been overruled in
the Court's previous history. ' 185  Over the course of its twelve-year
tenure (1937 to 1949), the Court handed down forty-two rulings that
overturned at least fifty-nine of its prior decisions.186 The majority of
these decisions had broad support-with only five of these cases
decided by a five-to-four vote (as compared to ten unanimous
overruling decisions).187
The legacy of the New Deal Court was "free-wheeling
adjudication." '188  The Court "thoroughly repudiated the entire
doctrinal system of constitutional limitations on federal power over
the national economy" in a series of decisive strokes in the late 1930s
and early 1940s.'89 Rather than reinterpret or work against the
backdrop of existing precedent, the Court proclaimed that "the
ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitution itself and
not what we have said about it [in past decisions].1 9°
Correspondingly, in "swiftly" overruling longstanding precedent,19" '
the Court did more than put in place a legal regime backed by the
184. LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 122, at 208-15. For his part, Roosevelt lashed out at
the Court's conservatives for taking the country back to the "horse-and-buggy" days and,
ultimately, sought to appoint a coherent group of pro-New Deal Justices through his ill-
fated Court-packing plan. The Two Hundred and Ninth Press Conference, 4 PUB.
PAPERS 200, 209 (May 31, 1935).
185. POWE, supra note 1, at 485-86.
186. Albert P. Blaustein & Andrew H. Field, Overruling Opinions in the Supreme
Court, 57 MICH. L. REV. 151, 184-94 (1958); see also Banks, supra note 122, at 266
(highlighting a correlation between the number of overrulings and the changing
composition of the Court); S. Sidney Ulmer, An Empirical Analysis of Selected Aspects of
Lawmaking of the United States Supreme Court, 8 J. PUB. L. 414, 414-36 (1959) (detailing a
correlation between Senate confirmation hearings and Court overrulings; and showing a
positive correlation in general and a strikingly positive correlation from 1939-1941, where
six Senate confirmations yielded twenty-three overruled decisions).
187. See Blaustein & Field, supra note 186, at 184-94.
188. Raoul Berger, The Activist Legacy of the New Deal Court, 59 WASH. L. REV. 751,
751 (1984).
189. Bruce Ackerman, Taxation and the Constitution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 47 (1999).
190. Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 491-92 (1938) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
191. BORK, supra note 149, at 156 (discussing the New Deal Court).
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President and Congress. It also overruled important precedents in
cases where nobody asked it to do so. Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins1" is the most striking example of this practice. In Erie,
both parties sought to preserve Swift v. Tyson,193 that is, the federal
courts' then-existing practice of applying federal common law in
diversity cases. 194 The Court, however, overruled Swift without
briefing-concluding that it, and not the parties to a controversy,
decides whether a legal argument is or is not waivable. 195 Another
(perhaps more striking) example of the Court unilaterally overruling
precedent is Helvering v. Hallock. 96  In Helvering, the Court
"overruled fifty [precedents] ... five of which were its own, merely in
order to change a rule of statutory construction."'"
Against this backdrop, it is little wonder that the New Deal
Court pursued significant doctrinal innovations-particularly with
respect to the power of Congress and the states to regulate economic
issues. Consider, for example, the Court's repudiation of Hammer v.
Dagenhart's98 constrained view of federal regulatory power and its
embrace of seemingly limitless power in Wickard v Filburn.199
Hammer struck down a federal statute prohibiting the shipping (in
interstate commerce) of goods manufactured by children within
specified age ranges.2" Concluding that the production and
manufacture of goods were not part of commerce, the Court boldly
claimed that our federalist system would be "destroyed" by such
congressional encroachments into the state police power.20 1 Nearly
twenty-three years later, the New Deal Court unanimously overruled
Hammer in United States v. Darby2' and, in so doing, rejected the
192. 304 U.S. 64 (1937).
193. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
194. For an excellent discussion on this point, see generally EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR.,
BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION 100 (2000).
195. On the appropriateness of the Court sua sponte asserting its power to control a
case's underlying legal regime, compare generally Neal Devins, Asking the Right
Questions, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 251 (2000) (defending Supreme Court's sua sponte power),
with Erwin Chemerinsky, The Court Should Have Remained Silent: Why the Court Erred
in Deciding Dickerson v. United States, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 287 (2000) (criticizing the
Court's sua sponte consideration of Congress's power to statutorily overrule Miranda).
196. 309 U.S. 106 (1940).
197. S. Sidney Ulmer, Book Review, 90 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 418, 418 (1996) (reviewing
SAUL BRENNER & HAROLD J. SPAETH, STARE INDECISIS: THE ALTERATION OF
PRECEDENT ON THE SUPREME COURT, 1946-1992 (1995)).
198. 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
199. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
200. Hammer, 247 U.S. at 268-69 n.1, 277.
201. Id. at 276.
202. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
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Lochner Court's distinction between intrastate manufacture and
interstate shipment.0 3 At that time, however, there was reason to
think that the Court expected Congress to assemble some type of
record to back up its invocation of Commerce Clause authority. Not
only did the Court encourage Congress to make findings that
commerce indeed was affected, the Court's job was made easy by
Congress's "sustained and increasingly thoughtful" efforts to
demonstrate the nexus between its regulatory scheme and our
increasingly integrated national economy.2°4
For this very reason, the Secretary of Agriculture's 1941 efforts
to extend a quota on wheat production to a farmer who grew wheat
for home consumption seemed vulnerable to constitutional attack.
The Agriculture Adjustment Act, the law that authorized the
Secretary's actions, was passed without a factual record.2"5 In
defending this statute, the government relied on stipulated facts.20 6
Indeed, when the Court heard oral arguments in Wickard (in May
1942), the Justices initially voted to remand the case so that a trial
court could make additional factual findings. 27  But this nod to
limited judicial review of congressional invocations of the Commerce
Clause was abandoned and, in its stead, the Court effectively granted
Congress carte blanche authority to use its Commerce Clause power
to regulate anything arguably economic. Not only did the Court
dispense with the requirement that Congress assemble some type of
record, Wickard explicitly recognized that Congress may regulate
economic conduct "trivial by itself" so long as the aggregation of
similar activity by other actors affects interstate commerce.28
Recognizing (in private correspondence) that we no longer have
"legal judgment upon economic effects which we can oppose to the
policy judgment made by Congress in legislation," Wickard's author,
203. Id. at 116-17.
204. Philip P. Frickey, The Fool on the Hill: Congressional Findings, Constitutional
Adjudication, and United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 695, 711 (1996).
205. Barry Cushman, Formalism and Realism in Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 67
U. CHI. L. REV. 1089, 1138 (2000).
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-28 (1942). For an excellent treatment of
Wickard's reach and the factual context of the decision, see Jim Chen, The Story of
Wickard v. Filburn: Agriculture, Aggregation, and Congressional Power over Commerce,
in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES, supra note 17, at 69.
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Associate Justice Robert Jackson, observed: "I really know of no
",209place.., where we can bound the doctrine ....
Wickard exemplifies what a coherent Court can do. Not needing
to engage in horse trading over votes, a coalition of five or more
Justices can advance an expansive view of the law. Furthermore,
when prior precedents are at odds with that view of the law, the Court
(as it did in Darby) can simply overturn the earlier precedent. Unlike
the post-1962 Warren Court, however, New Deal Court decisions
embracing federal and state regulation of economic activities were
not countermajoritarian in any way.
One final comment about the New Deal Court: that the Court
operated as a coherent Court on economic questions does not mean
that the Court was coherent in all respects. Roosevelt used his
appointment power to ensure that the Court would allow the
regulatory state to grow without judicial interference. But Roosevelt
was not especially interested in constitutionalizing civil liberties and
civil rights.21  At the time of his proposed Court-packing plan, the
issue of economic regulation (including the power of government to
establish a regulatory state) was the only one that mattered.211 New
209. Cushman, supra note 205, at 1143 (quoting a memorandum from Justice Jackson
to his law clerk, Costelloe); id. at 1145 (quoting a letter Justice Jackson sent to his friend,
and later Associate Justice, Sherman Minton).
210. For example, the Roosevelt Justice Department steered clear of Supreme Court
litigation involving Texas's practice of prohibiting non-whites from voting in the
Democratic primaries. See Michael J. Klarman, The White Primary Rulings: A Case Study
in the Consequences of Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 55, 79
(2001). Moreover, Roosevelt backed the World War II internment of Japanese
Americans (and did not end the internment until Felix Frankfurter notified the
administration that the Supreme Court was set to rule against the administration in Ex
Parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944)). See LOUIS FISHER & NEAL DEVINS, POLITICAL
DYNAMICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 249-51 (4th ed. 2006); Patrick 0. Gudridge, Essay:
Remember Endo?, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1933, 1934 (2003). Finally, Roosevelt used his
"plethora" of Supreme Court nominees to advance his regulatory agenda. Civil rights and
civil liberties issues played no meaningful role in these appointments (and, indeed, FDR's
Supreme Court nominees did not operate as a cohesive group when deciding cases
implicating civil rights and liberties). See Jack M. Ballan & Sanford Levinson, The
Processes of Constitutional Change: From Partisan Entrenchment to National Coalition
State, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 497 (2006); Harry G. Huspelling, The Roosevelt Court
and the Changing Nature of American Liberalism, in FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OFTHE SUPREME COURT 216, 238 (Stephen Shaw et al. eds., 2004).
211. On Roosevelt's interest in centralizing governmental authority, see generally PERI
E. ARNOLD, MAKING THE MANAGERIAL PRESIDENCY 81-117 (1986); RICHARD
POLENBERG, REORGANIZING ROOSEVELT'S GOVERNMENT (1966); and Barry D. Karl,
Constitution and Central Planning: The Third New Deal Revisited, 1988 SUP. CT. REV.
163.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Deal reforms concerned economic matters, not individual rights;2 12 at
the time of Court-packing, the Court's docket had next-to-no cases
implicating civil liberties and civil rights.21 3 With the Court's approval
of the modern welfare-regulatory state, the Court inevitably turned to
other matters-and that meant the Court turned its attentions to
individual rights issues.214  "Having abdicated the responsibility of
determining whether legislation was rationally related to a legitimate
public purpose," as Howard Gillman put it, "judges created for
themselves a new role in the political system, one that involved
identifying those 'preferred freedoms' or 'suspect classifications' that
might provide a basis for trumping the otherwise unrestrained power
of the modern legislature. 2 15  Here, the Court's liberals divided-
over the appropriateness of deferring to governmental conduct that
limited civil liberties, over the incorporation of the Bill of Rights into
the Fourteenth Amendment, and much more.216  This division
persisted through the end of the pre-1962 Warren Court.2 7
III. CONCLUSION: PRECEDENT AND THE ROBERTS COURT
By highlighting differences between coherent and incoherent
Courts, this Article has backed up a series of commonsense claims
about the role of ideological cohesion in Supreme Court
decisionmaking. In particular, coherent Courts are far more willing
than incoherent Courts to overturn landmark constitutional
precedents, to pursue doctrinal innovations, and to embrace rule-like
decisionmaking (in an effort to bind lower courts, government
officials, and others). This Article has also called attention to some
not-so-obvious differences between coherent and incoherent Courts.
On a coherent Court, power resides with a majority coalition, not the
median Justice. Specifically, Justices in the majority coalition rarely
212. I do not mean to suggest that individual rights played no role in New Deal
policymaking. President Roosevelt, for example, proposed a second Bill of Rights on
January 11, 1944. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS: FDR'S
UNFINISHED REVOLUTION AND WHY WE NEED IT MORE THAN EVER 1-2, 9-14 (2006);
William Forbath, Rights Stuff, AMERICAN PROSPECT, Aug. 13, 2004 (reviewing
SUNSTEIN, supra).
213. See LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 122, at 235 (noting that only two of 160 written
opinions in the 1935 Term implicated civil rights and liberties).
214. See id. at 235-36; KECK, supra note 104, at 17-37.
215. GILLMAN, supra note 177, at 202-03.
216. KECK, supra note 104, at 26-37 (noting this divide, especially the competing
jurisprudential approaches of Felix Frankfurter and Hugo Black).
217. See id. at 38-67 (noting Frankfurter's profound role in shaping pre-1962 Warren
Court decisionmaking and, relatedly, the inability of the Warren Court to operate as a
coherent Court until Goldberg took Frankfurter's seat).
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break rank and, as such, are more willing to sign onto opinions with
which they disagree.2 18  During the post-1962 Warren era, for
example, the Chief Justice paid little attention to ideological
considerations when assigning opinions.2 19 The reason: the majority
coalition stayed together, and individual Justices were typically
willing to defer to their colleagues' decisions (even if they would have
written a somewhat different opinion). 22' Likewise, the New Deal
Court granted Congress more power than some members of the
majority coalition thought appropriate. 21
In sharp contrast, power resides with the median Justice on an
incoherent Court. During the pre-1962 Warren Court, Justices
Frankfurter and Harlan pushed for constitutional avoidance in
antisubversive cases (even though four members of the Court would
likely have been willing to issue pro-civil liberties constitutional
rulings).222 During the Rehnquist Court, Justice O'Connor and, to a
lesser extent, Justice Kennedy sought to narrow the scope of Court
decisionmaking through the filing of concurring opinions and/or
conditioning their vote on the majority making concessions-giving
them wiggle room to rule differently in related cases.223
Differences between coherent and incoherent Courts are also
relevant in understanding the models that political scientists use in
studying the Court. For a coherent Court, Justices in the majority
coalition typically vote their legal policy preferences (since they agree
with each other). At the same time, the doctrine produced by a
coherent Court may not reflect the precise preferences of Justices in
the majority coalition (since they are more apt to defer to an opinion
writer-with whom they generally agree-than to demand
concessions). Coherent Courts, moreover, are willing to risk political
backlash. They have stronger policy preferences and, as such, will
only back away from those preferences when there is very good
reason to fear retaliation. For this reason, Warren Court liberals did
218. See supra notes 127-29 and accompanying text (noting intra-Court agreement
rates); supra note 5 and accompanying text (noting the deference accorded opinion writers
by other Justices in majority).
219. See Maltzman & Wahelbeck, supra note 4, at 560-61.
220. For general treatments of this subject, see EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 6, at
95-107. See generally Chris W. Bonneau et al., Agenda Controls, the Median Justice, and
the Majority Opinion on the U.S. Supreme Court, 51 AM. J. POL. Sci. 891 (2007)
(documenting Supreme Court decisions between 1969 and 1986 where typically the
agenda-setting power of the majority opinion author was most influential on judicial
outcomes).
221. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 115-18 and accompanying text.
223. See supra Part I.A.
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not back away from pro-Communist rulings in the wake of failed
efforts to strip the Court of jurisdiction (and did retreat from their
criminal procedure revolution after Congress enacted legislation that
ostensibly reversed Miranda).224 Put another way, the attitudinal
model largely prevails on a coherent Court, although opinion writers
on the majority coalition exercise disproportionate power and some
attention is paid to external factors (including, for example, political
backlash) .225
By contrast, the attitudinal model appears to be an unreliable
predictor for an incoherent Court. Swing Justices have comparatively
weak policy preferences and, as such, are more apt to pay attention to
the risk of backlash, elite opinion,226 and their desire to maintain
power (by maintaining their median Justice status).227 Consider, for
example, Justice Frankfurter's and Justice Harlan's backing away
from pro-civil liberties rulings in antisubversive cases. It may be that
these Justices feared congressional reprisals (the Court-curbing bill
was barely defeated) and/or these Justices may have been stung by
the criticism of bar groups, distinguished jurists, and lawmakers . 8
Likewise, Justices Kennedy and O'Connor seemed very sensitive to
external forces-going so far as to emphasize (when reaffirming Roe
in Casey) both the costs of "overrul[ing] under [political] fire" and
explicitly linking the Court's "legitimacy" to people's "confidence in
the Judiciary. "229 Correspondingly, median Justices on an incoherent
224. See supra notes 174-75 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Congress's
response to Miranda, see Cassell, supra note 174, at 194-97.
225. There is one other reason why the attitudinal model may place too much emphasis
on the policy preferences of the median Justice. In particular, the majority coalition
operates as a group and it may be that the median Justice does not pull other members of
the group to their policy preferences. The median Justice, as noted above, might defer to
the opinion writer. It may also be that the preferences of the median member of the
majority coalition is a better bellwether for how the Court will rule than are the
preferences of the median member of the Court.
226. "Elite opinion" includes the views of, among others, academics, journalists,
distinguished jurists, and bar groups. For a provocative treatment of the importance of
elites and other groups to judicial decisionmaking, see generally BAUM, supra note 118.
227. For treatment of this subject, see generally id. (suggesting that Supreme Court
Justices are interested in maintaining their status among groups that matter to them). As
to whether Baum is correct, it depends. His arguments are most persuasive in the case of
swing Justices and less persuasive with respect to Justices who sit on a coherent Court-
who, as noted above, are more apt to vote their policy preferences (even if the final
decision is not precisely what they would have written).
228. See supra notes 116-19 and accompanying text.
229. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 867 (1992). For a more
detailed treatment of the role of external forces in O'Connor and Kennedy
decisionmaking, including the decision not to hear divisive religion and race cases, see
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Court-as noted above-are more likely to engage in strategic
bargaining over the content of majority opinions and/or file
concurring opinions. For all these reasons, incoherent Courts do not
seem driven by policy-maximizing decisionmaking. Policy
preferences, no doubt, figure into decisionmaking, but external forces
also figure into the decision, as does internal strategic behavior (such
as Chief Justice Rehnquist's efforts to cobble together a five-Justice
majority in Glucksberg).3 °
What then of the Roberts Court and its attitudes towards
precedent? Much has been made about the perceived preferences of
Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito to narrow and
reinterpret precedent (rather than to overrule disfavored
precedent)."' For reasons detailed in this Article, it is premature to
speculate on whether Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito truly
prefer to operate as legal craftsman or whether they would prefer to
overturn disfavored precedent and make significant doctrinal
innovations.232 Specifically, after two Terms, the Roberts Court is an
incoherent Court. There is a solid liberal block of four (that typically
operates as a coherent block, signing onto each other's opinions in
significant cases);233 there is a less solid but generally cohesive block
generally Neal Devins, Congress and the Making of the Second Rehnquist Court, 47 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 773 (2003).
230. See supra Part I.A.1.
231. The Court has been criticized from both the right (for not overruling) and the left
(for ignoring stare decisis through dishonest opinions that, in fact, nullify longstanding
precedent). Posting of Lyle Denniston to SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotusblog.com/
wp/uncategorized/commentary-the-assault-on-faux-judicial-restraint (June 25, 2007, 17:14
CDT) (discussing Justice Scalia's criticism of the Court for not overruling precedent);
Posting of Geoffrey R. Stone to The Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
geoffrey-r-stone/roberts-alito-and-the-ru b54273.html (June 28, 2007, 19:30 EST)
(criticizing Scalia and Roberts for writing opinions guided by "rank ideology, ... [not]
respect for the rule of law"). For a discussion both of Chief Justice Roberts's and Justice
Alito's purported commitment to judicial modesty (including adherence to precedent), as
well as a preliminary assessment of why the Roberts Court "will not make constitutional
law in an unusually modest fashion," see David E. Klein, Modesty, of a Sort, in the Setting
of Precedents, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1213, 1245 (2008).
232. On this point, former Kennedy clerk Michael Dorf speculated that Roberts and
Alito are acting strategically-appealing to Kennedy by making "incremental moves and
not acknowledging when he's overturning precedents." Morning Edition: The Roberts
Court and the Role of Precedent (National Public Radio broadcast July 3, 2007), available
at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=11688820 (quoting Michael
Dorf).
233. See Epstein et al., supra note 2, at 1319, 1328 (noting that the current Court
consists of four liberals and four conservative Justices in addition to Justice Kennedy); see
also TUSHNET, supra note 66, at 49-70 (contrasting the competing decisionmaking styles
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of four conservatives (who typically agree with each other on
outcomes but do not issue unitary opinions that speak for all four
Justices).234 And one Justice, Anthony Kennedy, stands in the
middle. Indeed, as Lee Epstein's Article in this Symposium Issue
demonstrates, Kennedy's ideological preferences are significantly
more conservative than the liberal bloc and significantly more liberal
than the Court's four conservatives (so much so that there is no
prospect of Kennedy consistently joining either the Court's liberals or
conservatives) .235
If presidential appointments resulted in a five-member
conservative bloc, Kennedy's vote would no longer be salient-and,
consequently, the Roberts Court could overrule precedent and
pursue doctrinal innovations without fear of losing Kennedy's vote.
This is particularly true today because the elected branches seem
comfortable with the Court's assertions of supremacy and, more
generally, the Court's power to invalidate federal statutes and
executive initiatives.236 Likewise, if a Democratic President were able
to use her appointments power to create a five-member liberal bloc,
Kennedy's vote would not be consequential. Such a Court (with
Roberts at the helm) might well overturn disfavored Rehnquist Court
rulings and, in their stead, pursue progressive doctrinal innovations
intended to bind elected officials and lower courts.
For the time being, of course, Kennedy's vote is extremely
salient. In the 2006-2007 Term, Kennedy was in the majority in each
of the Court's twenty-four five-to-four rulings.237 In the nineteen
cases where the Court split five to four along liberal-conservative
lines, Kennedy joined the conservative bloc on thirteen occasions and
the liberal bloc on six occasions.238 Likewise, in the 2005-2006 Term,
of conservatives on the Rehnquist Court-a comparison that applies with equal force to
the Roberts Court).
234. See Epstein et al., supra note 2, at 1320.
235. See id. (noting "the gap between Kennedy and the Justices to his right and left").
236. See generally KEITH WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL
SUPREMACY (2007) (highlighting ways in which the executive branch backs judicial
supremacy); Neal Devins, Congress as Culprit: How Lawmakers Spurred on the Court's
Anti-Congress Crusade, 51 DUKE L.J. 435 (2001) (discussing ways Congress has facilitated
judicial assertions of supreme interpretive authority, including judicial invalidations of
federal law). For a somewhat competing perspective, see Barry Friedman & Anna
Harvey, Electing the Supreme Court, 78 IND. L.J. 123, 125 (2003) (arguing that the
Rehnquist Court's willingness to invalidate federal statutes is tied to fact that Congress
agrees with such invalidations).
237. See Charles Lane, Narrow Victories Move Roberts Court to the Right, WASH.
POST, June 29,2007, at A4.
238. Id.
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Kennedy cast the decisive votes on cases where the Court divided on
liberal-conservative lines,239  most notably ruling against the
government in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.24  In the 2007-2008 Term,
Kennedy is likely to be in the majority, if not casting the deciding
vote, in key cases involving enemy combatants and the
constitutionality of lethal injections. 41
When Kennedy and O'Connor were the "swing" Justices on the
Rehnquist Court, Kennedy seemed willing both to write sweeping
opinions (whose reasoning he might not be willing to extend to other
cases) and to sign onto expansive opinions that he did not fully agree
with (so long as those opinions did not refer to precedents with whose
outcome he disagreed).242 Now that he is the indisputable median
Justice on the Roberts Court, Kennedy may be playing things more
cautiously-writing concurring opinions (as he did in Hamdan and in
the pair of 2007 public school "affirmative action" cases) 243 or by
239. Charles Lane, Kennedy Reigns on the Supreme Court, WASH. POST, July 2, 2006,
at A6.
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lazarus/20070927.html; Posting of Lyle Denniston to SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotus
blog.com/wp/commentary-and-analysis/commentary-can-constitutional-issues-be-finessed
(Dec. 5, 2007 13:33 CST). Indeed, some commentators have suggested that Kennedy-
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in order to side with the liberals. Linda Greenhouse, Clues to the New Dynamic on the
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REV. 104 (2007) (arguing that Kennedy is at once sensitive to his role as "swing Justice"
on the Roberts Court and his longstanding belief in constitutional liberalism). Kennedy
was in the majority in the case of Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. _, 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008)
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writing plurality opinions that try to find a middle ground between
the Court's liberals and conservatives (something he did in United
States v. Rapanos,24 a 2006 environmental law ruling).2 41 In this way,
Kennedy may both give himself more room to "swing" in subsequent
cases and give lower courts and elected officials significant leeway to
interpret Supreme Court decisions.246 Whether or not Kennedy acts
more cautiously, one thing is clear: the Roberts Court is, for the time
being, an incoherent Court. It is unlikely to overrule significant
constitutional precedent or embrace rule-like doctrines that will bind
it, lower courts, and government officials.
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246. Alternatively, Kennedy can do what he did on the Rehnquist Court-embrace
sweeping opinions whose logic is at odds with other opinions that he has written or joined.
This is what Kennedy seemed to do in the Court's 2007 opinion upholding federal partial-
birth abortion legislation. Gonzalez v Carhart, 550 U.S. _, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007); see
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..... ). Writing for the majority, Kennedy paid short shrift to opinions he had written
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authored). On the other hand, Kennedy added a curious caveat to his approval of the
federal ban-noting that the decision was a facial challenge and suggesting that he might
rule the statute unconstitutional in an "as applied" challenge. See id. In this way,
Kennedy kept his options open. For a competing perspective on Kennedy's role on the
Roberts Court, see Cass R. Sunstein, Split Decision, in INST. OF BILL OF RIGHTS LAW,
2007-2008 SUPREME COURT PREVIEW 484, 484 (2007) (claiming that Kennedy, like
Roberts and Alito but unlike Scalia and Thomas, "avoids theoretical ambition" in his
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